Egils Zviedris 
Director of the Constitution Protection Bureau
In April 12th, 2025, the Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB), marks its 30th anniversary. Established in the spring of 1995, by a decision of the Latvian Parliament, Saeima, SAB’s history coincides with the rebirth of our country. In the early 1990s, Latvian foreign and defence policy was focused on dismantling the remnants of Soviet occupation – working towards the withdrawal of the Russian army from Latvia (which concluded in 1998) and reintegration into the Western community. It was clear that Russia, the heir to the USSR, could re-emerge as a threat to our national security, once it had recovered from the economic and political damage caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The Constitution Protection Bureau was created as a completely new intelligence service, without the experience, culture and “values” of the State Security Committee (KGB). A decision, which, at the time, draw a lot of criticism. There were quite a few suggestions that a lot could be gained by employing the experienced KGB “professionals” loyal to Latvia. However, looking back, it is clear that the right call was made. Unlike other countries in the region, Latvia managed to minimize the risks of espionage arising from the corporate connections of Soviet-era KGB officers. Yet, creating a brand new institution had its own challenges, while acquiring knowledge from Western partners, building our capabilities, and seeking and developing our own areas of expertise.
Getting rid of the Soviet legacy was an important condition for building bilateral relations with Western intelligence and security services. Cooperation between intelligence services is based on mutual trust, which has to be built through tireless and consistent actions over a long period of time. Even the title and legal status of the SAB reflect the principles of a democratic state. Constitution Protection Bureau is submitted to the constitution and the rule of law, rather than a particular state official, as it is characteristic for authoritarian countries. The political balance, neutrality and objectivity in SAB’s relations to other government institutions and appointed officials is also ensured by the requirement for the director of SAB to be confirmed by the majority of the Saeima.
The Centre for Documentation of the Consequences of Totalitarianism, which is part of the SAB, also played a significant role in dismantling the Soviet legacy. SAB ensured the preservation and collection of KGB documents, which allowed for the legal and moral rehabilitation of people who had been spied on, persecuted and repressed by the “cheka”. In accordance with the requirements of the law “On Preservation and Use of Documents of the State Security Committee (KGB) and on Establishment of the Fact of Collaboration with the KGB”, SAB digitized the KGB documents. In 2019, the materials were transferred to National Archives of Latvia for permanent storage, where they are currently available on the archive’s website.
Over the years, the SAB developed its capabilities to ensure the protection of classified information. Effective protection of classified information enhances public confidence in government authorities and assures foreign partner services that the provided information is adequately protected. These factors were essential for the establishment of the National Security Authority in 2003, which was a mandatory requirement for Latvia’s membership in NATO and the European Union. Each member state must establish an authority supervising the protection of classified information. These requirements are also related to the SAB’s obligation to conduct counterintelligence in accordance with NATO and European Union standards. The procedures for protection of NATO and European Union classified information implemented in Latvia are regularly checked and positively assessed during inspections by the Security Office of the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union and NATO Office of Security, which is a high assessment of our work.
Security clearances for access to classified information have always attracted a lot of public and political attention. Vetting for access to national classified information is carried out by all three state security institutions, while security clearances for access to Latvian national TOP SECRET information are issued only by SAB, based on the vetting carried out by all three state security institutions. Looking back over the past years, SAB has denied TOP SECRET security clearances for officials representing the entire political spectrum. In my opinion, this clearly shows the professionalism and political neutrality of SAB, rejecting the occasional claims of “political incompetence”, “supporting the ruling parties” or “maintaining a police state”. From time to time, the principles and procedures for protection of classified information have been scrutinized by the public for various reasons, however, today’s rapidly changing geopolitical situation has shown that the current procedures allow us to prevent or minimize internal security risks.
Nowadays, collective decision-making requires increasing cooperation between intelligence and security services, making international cooperation an important aspect of the SAB’s activities. Latvian foreign and security policy is focused on European and transatlantic cooperation within the framework of NATO. This entails a number of international responsibilities and obligations.
After Latvia’s accession to NATO, 2011 was a particularly important year in the history of the SAB. Our service chaired a newly established NATO structure – the Civil Intelligence Committee, which unites more than 40 intelligence services. Latvia (SAB) was the first presiding country in this format, which continues to operate today. After discussions among member states and an assessment of the existing system, a decision was made to reform the structure of NATO bodies – several committees were closed, reduced or merged. The member states agreed to expand and modernize the NATO intelligence system. Within the framework of NATO, the SAB conducts extensive cooperation in the areas of intelligence, counterintelligence and protection of classified information. We have always been guided by the principle that we are part of NATO, instead of viewing it as an external structure. To this day, cooperation between intelligence services of NATO nations belongs to the foundation of Latvian security.
We have, occasionally, encountered criticism regarding the SAB’s allegedly slow or ineffective activities. In many cases, the specific nature of our work and the legislative restrictions do not allow us to reveal the full reasoning behind the decisions made. However, I would like to emphasize that SAB has always acted and will continue to act in the best interests of Latvian national security.
Without national security there can be no independence or even existence of our country. No matter what the future might bring, we are ready and determined to protect the security of Latvia.
It is our greatest honour to serve Latvia!
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30 Years Guarding National Security

On February 17, the Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB) publishes the unclassified part of the annual report for the year 2024. Along with last year&#8217;s analysis, SAB also provides forecast on the possible development of current security issues.
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, European countries have faced a new but increasingly significant threat – sabotage, diversions and physical attacks on targets in Europe by Russian intelligence and security services. In 2024, cases of Russian-organized sabotage have significantly increased, affecting more and more European countries. The new trend confirms that Russia is already having a direct confrontation with the West.
Russian intelligence and security services are currently developing their capabilities to organize sabotage in Europe. It is part of Moscow’s preparation for a possible military confrontation with NATO in the long term. The current concentration of Russian military resources in Ukraine makes the likelihood of a direct Russian-NATO military confrontation in 2025 rather low. However, if the war would become “frozen” and Russia would no longer have to suffer significant losses during the active hostilities in Ukraine, Moscow would be able to increase its military presence next to NATO’s north-eastern flank, including the Baltics within the next 5 years. This scenario would significantly increase Russia’s military threat to NATO, states the report.
“When facing a potential external threat, it is particularly important to maintain domestic stability and resilience. This applies at all levels, from the individual to the political, including the international arena. The decision-makers must think strategically, considering the long-term developments and security context. To maintain our security, we must develop our strength - no one tries to attack the strong and self-confident,” emphasizes Egils Zviedris, director of SAB, commenting on the current security challenges.
The classified part of the annual report will be reviewed by the Cabinet of Ministers and the National Security Commission of the Parliament of Latvia. Thereby the directions of the activities of the Constitution Protection Bureau for the year 2025 will be approved.
The full text of the report is available <a href="/files/uploads/2025/02/SAB-gada-parskats_2024_ENG.pdf">here</a>.
It is also possible to find out about the annual report, as well as other information disseminated by SAB on the social network X: @SAB_LV.
SAB report provides an overview of counter-intelligence, cyber security, intelligence and classified information protection issues in 2024. The report also includes an assessment of domestic and foreign policy developments in Russia and Belarus in 2024, taking into account the particularly active efforts of the special services of these countries to influence the EU and NATO countries, including Latvia.

Russia is purposefully developing its capabilities to confront NATO, Constitution Protection Bureau states, publishing its annual report

The Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Latvia and The Government of the Netherlands concerning Security Measures for the Protection of Classified Information was signed on 15 January 2025. The text of the Agreement was drafted by the Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB) in cooperation with the competent authorities of the Netherlands. The Agreement was signed by the Latvian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ms Baiba Braže, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Mr Caspar Veldkamp.
There is no valid agreement between Latvia and the Netherlands on protection of classified Information, therefore the signing of the agreement is essential for the cooperation, especially in the field of security and defense.
The agreement establishes a unified and detailed framework for the processing and protection of classified information, which is an important aspect for the cooperation between both countries, especially in military and economic field. The new regulation will also allow companies that have been granted facility security clearances to participate in classified tenders of the other country.
As the National Security Authority, SAB represents Latvia in the negotiation process of bilateral security agreements. It can take a long time to align two different regulatory frameworks for protection of classified information and ratification of agreements. The drafting of the particular lasted for several years.

Agreement between Latvia and the Netherlands on Protection of Classified Information was signed on 15 January 2025

The Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Latvia and The Government of the United States of America concerning Security Measures for the Protection of Classified Information was signed on 12 December 2024. The text of the Agreement was drafted by the Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB) in cooperation with the competent authorities of the US. The Agreement was signed by the Latvian Minister of Justice, Ms Inese Lībiņa-Egnere, and US Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Republic of Latvia, Mr Christopher Robinson.
The Agreement establishes a unified and detailed framework for the processing and protection of classified information, which is an essential aspect of the increasing political, military and economic cooperation between both countries. Exchange of classified information is particularly important for a full-fledged defence cooperation, enabling a common perception of threats, and provision of military and technical support. The new regulation will also allow companies that have been granted facility security clearances to participate in classified tenders of the other country (e.g. Latvian companies will now be able to participate in US tenders involving classified information).
As the National Security Authority, SAB represents Latvia in the negotiation process of bilateral security agreements. It can take a long time to align two different regulatory frameworks for protection of classified information and ratification of agreements. The drafting of the Latvian-US Agreement lasted for several years.
The entering into force of the new Agreement will terminate the Latvian-US Agreement for protection of classified military information, concluded in 1998.
SAB is currently negotiating security agreements with the Netherlands, North Macedonia, Poland, Belgium, and Malta.

Agreement between Latvia and the United States of America on Protection of Classified Information was signed on 12 December 2024

Please find below Annual Public Reports of the Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB). Public reports partially contain the information which is included in SAB’s report to the Cabinet of Ministers of Latvia (the Government).

Neutralisation of activities of intelligence and security services unfriendly to Latvia.

Obtaining background information on activities of foreign institutions or persons against the interests of the Latvian state.

Issuance of special permits for access to state secrets. Protection of EU and NATO classified information.

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Russia&#8217;s relations with Western countries have gradually deteriorated since the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the start of hostilities in east of Ukraine. Further Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, which also included targeting civilians in conquered territories and targeted attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure, has further increased antagonism between the two sides.
Russia&#8217;s relations with NATO are particularly important within the framework of relations between Russia and the West. Historically, Russia has perceived NATO as a long-term threat. This is due to NATO as the world&#8217;s strongest defence alliance, as well as developments since the end of the Cold War, when most of the Eastern European countries chose to secure their defence through NATO membership. Such choices by European countries have reduced Russia&#8217;s ability to influence the politics of the countries concerned and led to a reduction in Russian influence in the region.
Eroding NATO&#8217;s role and presence in the Eastern Europe was central to Russia&#8217;s stated ultimatum to the US and Western nations in December 2021, when Russia had already begun widespread deployment of troops at Ukraine&#8217;s borders. Since the invasion began, anti-NATO statements have become part of the daily rhetoric of Russian officials. Part of the statements also include making a direct threat to the NATO alliance and its Member States.
How Russia will build further relations with NATO can be influenced by a combination of factors - Russia&#8217;s ability to rebuild its military and defence industry, Russia&#8217;s economic situation and political considerations. The further development of NATO&#8217;s defence and deterrence capabilities is equally important.
Russia&#8217;s military capabilities and their potential changes
About 360,000 troops took part in Russia&#8217;s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Russia has reportedly lost more than 315,000 troops (dead and wounded) since the invasion began, according to the publicly available information. Ukrainian sources show even higher Russian army losses - exceeding 400,000.
The significant loss of the Russian army is illustrated by the necessity for mobilization. As early as September 2022, Vladimir Putin signed a decree declaring partial mobilization to maintain the military&#8217;s combat capability. The recruiting of the fighters was also carried out by representatives of “private” military companies fighting in Ukraine, for example, “Wagner group" recruits their potential soldiers in Russian prisons.
The mobilization in Russia continues in a hidden way, as only in this way can the losses of live force in Ukraine be compensated. Mostly financial incentives such as salary that is above Russia&#8217;s average are used to attract young soldiers. Specific activities, including the involvement of law enforcement, are carried out to recruit in the armed forces migrants from Central Asian countries who have recently acquired Russian citizenship. Separate recruiting campaigns have also been caried out outside Russia in countries such as Syria, India, Cuba and Nepal. Repeated “open” mobilization has also not been ruled out as the war and Russia&#8217;s losses continue. In making the decision on mobilization, Russia&#8217;s leading elite will be guided by the situation on the front and the overall sentiment in society.
Along with the loss of soldiers, since the beginning of the war Ukrainian forces have managed to destroy a significant amount – up to 9,000 Russian military equipment, including tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and other types of weapons, as well as aircraft and ships. The largest losses of soldiers and machinery can be seen directly in the ground forces, with the Russian navy and air force maintaining relatively high fighting capabilities.
As Russia&#8217;s invasion of Ukraine prolongs, the role of the military-industrial complex in maintaining the fighting effectiveness of Russian forces is growing. Russia has been able to adapt its production to the needs of war in the short term - to ensure repair of damaged machinery, modernization and adaptation of reserve equipment, as well as production of various types of munitions, including artillery ammunition and missiles. As hostilities in Ukraine continue, Russia&#8217;s ability to rebuild and replenish its arsenal is expected to decline. Already, sanctions are making access to Western-made components difficult. More expensive components imported into Russia through third countries must be used in arms production, bypassing sanctions, or relying on alternatives made in China or other countries that may be of lower quality or require additional adjustment.
Russia&#8217;s military-industrial complex continues to face challenges from the workforce - especially the higher-skilled workforce - as well as challenges in motivating employees to continue working under high intensity conditions. Production capacity may be negatively affected by the depreciation of the infrastructure used in production and by limited access to the components necessary to restore the operation of the infrastructure. The diversion of the military-industrial complex&#8217;s resources to maintain the Russian military&#8217;s combat capability in Ukraine further limits the development and deployment of new military technologies, which in the medium term may increase the technological gap of Russian-made armaments from Western or Chinese-made armaments.
The war in Ukraine and the geopolitical changes it has caused in Europe have made it necessary for Russia to assess the appropriateness of the existing model of armed forces. As early as late 2022, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu issued a statement on reform of the Russian Armed Forces, directed at improving command and control of the military and increasing the number of units of the armed forces and personnel to 1.5 million by 2026. In the western direction, as part of the reform, on February 26, 2024, the military areas of Moscow and Leningrad, which had been merged into Western military district since 2010, were restored.
Given the hostilities in Ukraine and the losses of Russian soldiers and machinery, it can be predicted with high credibility that Russia will face the challenges of making actual changes to its armed forces by 2026 and fully establishing and arming existing and newly formed units. This will not prevent Russia from developing a perception on the progress of the reform of the armed forces in public statements. The reform process will allow Russia to maintain an aggressive position on NATO members bordering Russia.
Top Russian officials regularly come up with threats to use nuclear weapons, including linking them to the course of hostilities in Ukraine and support from Western countries. The threat of the use of nuclear weapons is being used more intensively by Russian officials in cases where the Ukrainian army has succeeded on the front, or when the political discussion in the western countries about providing new support to Ukraine activates. In the assessment of SAB, the nuclear threat is seen as Russian attempts to discourage Western countries from providing further support to Ukraine, as well as more active decisions to strengthen NATO, in particular to reinforce the presence of allies in the east of the alliance. Through aggressive nuclear rhetoric, Russia also tends to raise the alert level in Western societies. Overall Russia is unlikely to use nuclear weapons in the short and medium term. The use of nuclear weapons would certainly trigger a negative international response from countries that are currently neutral or Russia-friendly, such as China. The use of nuclear weapons would also further consolidate Western countries, as well as could even make it easier to supply new types of weapons systems to Ukraine.
Russia&#8217;s economic situation and political considerations in relations with NATO
Russia&#8217;s war in Ukraine and related sanctions have had a negative impact on Russia&#8217;s economy and access to foreign capital. At the same time, Russia continues to use the tools at its disposal to promote economic resilience. Currently, one of the pillars of Russia&#8217;s economy is its military-industrial complex, as well as its still high revenues from international hydrocarbon trade, including bypassing sanctions and trade restrictions. As the war in Ukraine continues, Russia will continue to adapt its economy to the needs of war, which on the one hand will allow hostilities and Russian army combat capabilities to be sustained, but in the medium term will reduce or even halt Russia&#8217;s economic growth. More about the Russian economic situation since the invasion of Ukraine is described in <a href="https://sab.gov.lv/en/news/russian-economy-in-ukraines-war-perspective-impact-and-forecasts/">the previous material, created by SAB</a>.
Russia&#8217;s invasion of Ukraine was planned as a fast-paced war in which Ukrainian resistance would be overcome in a short time, not as a more than two-year-long conflict for which Russia was not prepared, either militarily or economically. Given the course of the war, Russia has to reassess the potential course of potential future conflicts and assess the country&#8217;s ability to engage in and win such a conflict.
The primary interest of Putin’s regime is to consolidate or hold their positions of power. Russia&#8217;s domestic and foreign political activities are planned to take into account the above-mentioned interest, thereby making less likely activities that directly threaten the stability of the regime. On the one hand, the conflict situation can be used by the regime to further mobilize society, on the other hand, risks to the regime to remain in power increase in the event of losses. Risks to the regime may rise despite the regime&#8217;s vast propaganda apparatus, which is already unable to contain socially active groups of society such as groups of "soldier`s mothers" during the Ukraine war. The failed course of war in Ukraine, including Ukraine&#8217;s ability to resist much larger Russian forces, makes it necessary for the V.Putin regime to reassess Russia&#8217;s ability to manage the war and achieve the intended result. In the assessment of SAB in the short and medium term, Russia&#8217;s willingness to embark on an open conventional military confrontation with a stronger adversary like NATO is unlikely.
Maintaining the external threat is one of the most common instruments of public mobilization in authoritarian countries and used by the Russian political regime. NATO is described in Russia as an aggressive anti-Russian organization and, in the medium term, it is more beneficial for Russia to maintain NATO&#8217;s image as an aggressor, thus continuing to mobilize public support around the political regime. Russian officials will continue to spread messages about NATO&#8217;s threat as Russia, and the need to pursue confrontational policies from Russia, in its public communications with varying intensity.
Russia&#8217;s relationship with NATO and the possibility of confrontation should also be assessed in the context of other regional and global policy processes. Regionally, Russia&#8217;s invasion of Ukraine has reduced Russian influence in neighboring regions, such as the South Caucasus or Central Asian countries. An open confrontation with NATO is likely to force countries in the region to seek alternative lines of cooperation, thus reducing Russia&#8217;s role in the region. Russia&#8217;s invasion of Ukraine has increased Russia&#8217;s dependence on China. China continues to strengthen as Russia&#8217;s energy market and the presence of Chinese goods in Russian markets is increasing. As China&#8217;s economic growth continues, in a situation where Russia&#8217;s economy is stagnating, there is a high likelihood that Russia will have to pay more strategic attention to China and how to curb Russia&#8217;s increased dependence on China.
Invading Ukraine, V.Putin&#8217;s regime had relied on a lack of unity in the West and the differing views of Western countries in relations with Russia. However, the war has fostered Western unity and readiness to implement measures to rein in Russian aggression. In addition, the Russian invasion has facilitated a review of the defence policy of Western countries, especially European countries, with most countries taking decisions to increase defence capabilities in the coming years. One indicator is the diverted public funding for defence, for example 18 of the 32 NATO members will divert at least 2% of GDP to defence in 2024. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, NATO Member States&#8217; defence spending accounted for 57.8% of global spending in 2023, while Russian spending was 4.8%.
Since the invasion began, NATO has taken a series of significant practical steps to strengthen deterrence and defense capabilities, such as developing new regional plans. An important step in strengthening the alliance&#8217;s shared capabilities, especially in the Baltic Sea region, is the accession of Finland and Sweden to the alliance.
Conclusion
The pace of Russia&#8217;s invasion of Ukraine has raised questions about further scenarios for Russian action, including a possible open confrontation with Western countries, including NATO members. The announcements of reforms by Russian forces aimed at strengthening a military presence in the country&#8217;s western regions, the regular threat of nuclear weapons use from Russian officials, as well as the generally confrontational tone maintained by Russia, give the impression of the inevitability of an open military confrontation.
A review of Russia&#8217;s actual situation, in turn, shows a number of factors that do not support what has been expressed in Russia`s rhetoric. First, the primary task of Russia&#8217;s defence sector is winning the war in Ukraine, diverting most of the resources of the armed forces and military-industrial complex and the armaments reserves accumulated in previous years to this aim. Russia will need time to restore the weapons lost in the war, train soldiers as well as restore reserves. These actions will have to be taken in circumstances where the Russian economy will continue to face challenges and the country will have to assess which needs to divert scarce resources.
While V. Putin&#8217;s regime remains stable, the war in Ukraine has intensified pressure on the regime, including creating new kinds of risks for the regime, as the “Prigozhin’s coup” demonstrated in June 2023. The primary objective of the V.Putin`s regime is to maintain its power and while confrontational policies with the West contribute to the mobilization of society and support for the regime, the fact remains that further escalation or open military conflict can also have unpredictable consequences for the regime. According to the SAB’s assessment, in the short and medium term, the V.Putin`s regime will continue to maintain confrontational relations with Western countries and NATO, including the threat of escalation, including the use of nuclear weapons. Russia will most likely continue to use different types of hybrid methods against NATO members, including information and influence operations and cyber-attacks. At the same time, the probability of conventional military confrontation with Russia remains low.

Russia-NATO relations in the context of confrontation

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