Today, on July 7th, the Cabinet of Ministers approved the National Threat Assessment prepared by the Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB).
The National Threat Assessment is a strategic document that includes a multifaceted assessment of the potential threats to Latvia over the next four years. To a great extent, the document focuses on Russia, taking into account its aggressive rhetoric and activities. The National Threat Assessment also reflects the impact of global security challenges on the Baltic Sea region&#8217;s security and resilience.
The National Threat Assessment is prepared by the SAB in cooperation with the Latvian State Security Service (VDD) and The Defence Intelligence and Security Service (MIDD). On the basis of this document, the National Security Concept is then prepared and approved by the government.
The content of The National Threat Assessment is not publicly available because it contains classified information.

The government accepts the National Threat Assessment submitted by the SAB

Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB) publishes a report “<a href="https://www.sab.gov.lv/files/uploads/2026/06/SAB_public_report_2_Lawfare.pdf">RUSSIA INTENSIFIES LAWFARE AGAINST THE WEST TO JUSTIFY MORE AGGRESSIVE ACTIVITIES</a>”.
In this report, SAB emphasizes: Russia plans to intensify lawfare with the aim of weakening and influencing Western countries. Russia can use legal arguments as pretext and justification for intensified aggressive activities or a potential confrontation against NATO. The report reveals intelligence information about Russia&#8217;s lawfare plans and tasks, defined by Russian institutions over the past year, aimed at putting pressure on political leaders and officials in Western countries.
One of the practical ways in which Russia is trying to put pressure on Western countries, is by submitting complaints against them in international courts. The Baltic states are not an exception. Russia plans to sue the Baltic states in the UN International Court of Justice, formally using the discrimination of so-called “Russian-speakers” as the justification. According to SAB intelligence, Russia has prepared the complaint and is currently preparing to file the case in court.
Although statements regarding violations of the rights of this part of society are constantly used in Russian propaganda and officials’ rhetoric, such a complaint would mark a significant change in the approach towards the Baltic states – namely, propaganda would become the foundation for practical action. Russia’s maximal goal is to put international pressure on the Baltic states to change their policy towards it.
Russia&#8217;s lawfare plans also mark Russia&#8217;s attempts to create a unified position of Russia-friendly countries to jointly confront the West. In particular, Russia learns from the Iranian experience in its lawsuits against the West.
This is the second public report by SAB. With these reports, SAB continues to provide a wider audience with reliable information on current security-related issues. This report, like the previous one, also includes previously non-public intelligence information.
Full report available <a href="https://www.sab.gov.lv/files/uploads/2026/06/SAB_public_report_2_Lawfare.pdf">here</a>.

Constitution Protection Bureau publishes a report on Russia’s lawfare against the Western countries

Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB) publishes a report "<a href="https://www.sab.gov.lv/files/uploads/2026/04/SAB_public-report_sanctions_ENG.pdf">WESTERN SANCTIONS CAUSE SIGNIFICANT LOSSES FOR RUSSIA’S ECONOMY</a>". SAB’s public report is a new way to continue to provide the wider public, including the media of Latvia and other countries, with essential, reliable information on current security-related issues.
In this report, SAB emphasizes - in the short term sanctions will not change Russia’s confrontational intent and activities, however, in the long term they are among the most effective tools to constrain Russia’s ability to threaten the West. Furthermore, the full potential of the sanctions has not yet been realised, they can be extended in order to stifle Russia’s future economic opportunities.
The report states - Despite Russia’s public announcements claiming its economy is successfully adapting to the impact of the Western sanctions, internal estimates made by several Russian institutions confirm that sanctions have already inflicted and will continue to create losses of up to several hundred billion USD to Russia’s economy. Russian estimates indicate that between the years 2022 to 2025 Russia was forced to spend additional 130 billion USD to buy sanctioned Western goods. The country’s own forecasts show that Western restrictions might lead to at least 136 billion USD in losses for Russia until 2030.
Russia has been attempting to achieve the cancellation of the Western sanctions through various channels, especially in the context of the ongoing diplomatic negotiations on the possible settlement for the war in Ukraine. SAB assesses that the lifting of sanctions will significantly increase the threat posed by Russia not only to Ukraine and Europe, but also globally. Even partial easing of sanctions would provide Russia with additional financial opportunities to accelerate the tempo of its military rearmament and allocate resources for influence campaigns around the world. Russia would also have more opportunities to intensify the confrontation with the Western countries as well.
Full report available<a href="https://www.sab.gov.lv/files/uploads/2026/04/SAB_public-report_sanctions_ENG.pdf"> here.</a>

Constitution Protection Bureau publishes a report on the impact of sanctions on Russia’s ability to threaten Western countries

Today, Latvian Cabinet of Ministers reviewed and approved SAB&#8217;s annual classified report 2025, and the proposed plans for 2026.
In accordance with the SAB’s Law, the annual report is submitted to the Cabinet of Ministers every year. The public part of this report was published this year on January 26 and is available <a href="https://sab.gov.lv/files/uploads/2026/01/SABs-annual-report_2025_ENG.pdf">here</a>.

SAB’s annual classified report 2025 and the proposed plans for 2026 approved today

Please find below Annual Public Reports of the Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB). Public reports partially contain the information which is included in SAB’s report to the Cabinet of Ministers of Latvia (the Government).

Neutralisation of activities of intelligence and security services unfriendly to Latvia.

Obtaining background information on activities of foreign institutions or persons against the interests of the Latvian state.

Issuance of special permits for access to state secrets. Protection of EU and NATO classified information.

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One of the most frequently discussed topics in the context of the Ukrainian war for more than two and a half years is the potential peace talks. Calls from politicians and officials to come to the negotiating table regularly appear in the media, offering various plans that could serve as a basis for peace talks, including from countries not directly involved in the hostilities. Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, there have even been several rounds of talks between Russia and Ukraine through various mediators, but so far these have not produced results beyond POW exchanges. In this context, attention must be paid to the factors that influence the likelihood of peace talks and their potential outcome.
While two countries are directly involved in the war, the indirect impact of the war affects a much larger number of countries. This means that the course of the war, and thus the opening of peace negotiations, can be directly or indirectly influenced by other countries. Given the dynamics of war, the political positions of states can change in the context of war, resulting in a set of interrelated factors influencing peace negotiations, which are discussed further below.
Strategic factors
The primary factor directly influencing the willingness and interest of the parties to enter negotiations is the situation at the frontlines. In the context of war, the belligerents make a calculation as to which instruments are better suited to achieve the desired objectives in the given situation. Confidence in one&#8217;s ability to achieve political objectives through military means reduces the interest in entering negotiations and risks undermining the maximum gains that can achieved by having the initiative on the battlefield. What is happening on the battlefield is an important consideration for negotiating positions: superiority and initiative at the front mean a greater ability to impose terms on the other side, as the weaker side is more inclined to cease hostilities. Consequently, the initiation and development of peace negotiations requires an understanding on the part of the parties involved that this is an acceptable instrument for protecting their interests and achieving their objectives.
In the context of the peace talks, it is important to highlight the Istanbul peace talks between Russia and Ukraine, which took place in April 2022 and were mediated by Turkey. During the negotiations, the parties reached an initial agreement on Ukraine&#8217;s future status - military neutrality, reduced armed forces, but with the possibility of joining the European Union (EU), while the status of Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk would be addressed in further negotiations. The so-called Istanbul Communiqué is a draft agreement to which Russian officials, including Vladimir Putin, regularly refer to in their statements. In this way, Russia is attempting to portray itself as ready for negotiations, while referring to a narrative that no longer reflects the current situation. The actual concessions made by Ukraine were influenced by the local and international context: only a month and a half since the start of the full-scale invasion, there was uncertainty about Ukraine&#8217;s ability to defend itself successfully, as well as about the willingness and ability of Western countries to provide Ukraine with the necessary military and economic support. Ukraine&#8217;s willingness to compromise was also influenced by the disclosure of crimes committed by the Russian Armed Forces in the occupied territories, which had repercussions for both Ukrainian and Western societies: it became clear what the population in other occupied territories would be subjected to, while reinforcing the view that this should not be allowed to go unpunished.
The second factor influencing the start, progress and ultimately the implementation of peace talks is the support of the societies involved. Public attitudes towards peace negotiations confer legitimacy on the officials who participate in the negotiation process on behalf of the state, and public support, or lack thereof, reflects not only on the domestic political situation, but also on the state&#8217;s ability to implement the agreement. This issue is particularly important for Ukraine, whose democratic system allows the people to express their opinion and thus their approval for a ceasefire or a negotiated end to the war. Sociological data from March of 2024 illustrate a complex situation, with 43% of the public in favour of negotiating peace with Russia. However, the majority of the public opposes the idea of renouncing EU or NATO membership and is categorically opposed to the proposal to reduce the size and capabilities of the Ukrainian armed forces. The data also show that the Ukrainian public would not be prepared to accept what they see as an unjust peace, with most of the population acknowledging their preparedness to demand a change of government in such a situation.
The peace negotiation process thus brings with it a complex domestic political dimension, in which society participates as a stakeholder in the debate on what constitutes a just peace. A negotiated settlement without public support can foster feelings of resentment and grievance, which in turn can manifest itself not only domestically but also in foreign policy settings, for example by calling for an aggressive or revanchist foreign policy. In this context, the depolitisation of Russian society, combined with the state&#8217;s monopoly on the information space, means that the public is potentially more willing to accept the Kremlin&#8217;s position. Ending the war without a complete capitulation of Ukraine would provoke resistance in some parts of society, but the general tendency of Russian society to accommodate the Kremlin&#8217;s positions would prevail, complemented by the range of repressive instruments available to the Kremlin. It should be stressed that ending the war poses significant long-term domestic political challenges for Russia, for example in terms of demobilisation of soldiers or state budget planning.
The domestic political situation in Western countries is a much-discussed factor. Ukraine&#8217;s position in the war is closely linked to the political resources of its international partners, and consequently the mood of Western publics, including the elites, towards Ukraine which can directly exert pressure in favour of an early start of peace talks and a quicker compromise. Ukraine is clearly aware of its position and part of its public diplomacy since February 2022 has been aimed directly at Western societies with the aim of explaining why Ukraine needs to be supported. One of Ukraine&#8217;s objectives in invading the Kursk region in the summer of 2024 was precisely to demonstrate its offensive capabilities in order to prevent the view of Ukraine losing taking root. However, recent domestic political developments in some Western countries show that the slogan of the need to cut aid to Ukraine is not a marginal one. In the recent regional parliamentary elections in Germany, parties whose rhetoric, among other promises, advocates normalisation of relations with Russia and a halt to military support for Ukraine made significant gains in two states. The opinion of Western societies points to a potential vulnerability - risk tolerance. Russia has a higher risk tolerance, i.e., a willingness to risk escalation that stems from Russia&#8217;s foreign policy principles. Russia has demonstrated this, for example, by conducting nuclear saber-rattling. In contrast, the logic of Western action is focused on escalation control and the need to avoid unplanned escalation. Russia has long sought to exploit this asymmetry against Western societies, and there is no reason to believe that Russia will stop it any time soon, even though it has not yet brought any clear benefits.
Far-reaching consequences
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is also very important in the context of the international political system. Russia has repeatedly postulated that its foreign policy is aimed at changing the existing rule-based international system into a multi-polar one. Peace negotiations leading to the legitimisation of Russia&#8217;s control over the occupied territories of Ukraine would create a dangerous precedent in which unprovoked aggression by a nuclear power, also including war crimes, would not be stopped or clearly punished. Although such a precedent would not mean an immediate repetition of the scenario elsewhere in the world, but it would seriously undermine the credibility and prestige of the current international system, especially the Western powers as the main enforcers of the international rules. It would, in fact, demonstrate that it is possible to unleash aggression and then force the victim to make concessions without adequate punishment. This is linked to a moral problem for Ukraine, namely that concessions to Russia would mean not only a legal renunciation of its own territories, but also of the Ukrainian citizens living in the occupied territories, who would thus lose hope and possibly a way of returning to Ukraine. The most fundamental problem would be precisely to make concessions to an aggressor state that has committed crimes against the Ukrainian people, and such concessions would have to be accepted not only by the Ukrainian society, but also by the Western.
One of the central issues in inter-state relations is the fulfilment of commitments. In the Ukrainian context, the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on security assurances in connection with Ukraine&#8217;s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons clearly illustrates this problem. This is an agreement signed by Ukraine, Russia, the UK and the US to provide Ukraine with security assurances in the context of its commitment to non-proliferation. The first point of the Memorandum is the signatories&#8217; guarantee to respect Ukraine&#8217;s independence, sovereignty and borders. Understandably, such recent experience with non-compliance is sensitive for Ukraine and affects its perception of other types of negotiations.
The Minsk agreements signed in 2014 and 2015 were aimed at stopping hostilities in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and creating a framework for resolving political and military issues. Practice has clearly shown that the implementation of agreements can be delayed and, in fact, sabotaged in the name of various interests. Ukraine&#8217;s experience also shows that the involvement of international observers does not guarantee the implementation of commitments if they do not have clear instruments of coercion at their disposal. The implementation of agreements and the willingness to comply are determined by the countries themselves, which can undermine national and public support for peace negotiations. Regarding Ukraine, the potential involvement of third parties in providing guarantees is sometimes considered, but this does not exclude the possibility that countries simply might not adhere to negotiated settlements.
The final problem, which forms the basis for any amicable settlement, is mutual mistrust. The negotiating parties, and especially the warring parties, must be able to trust the other side that the agreement will be honoured in the long term and lead to changes in policy and behaviour. Despite Russia’s different and conflicting explanations for the invasion’s objectives, long-term peace in Ukraine requires confidence that Russia will not use it to buy time and prepare for a new invasion. Similarly, Russia would need confidence that the sanctions imposed against it will be eased over time and that Ukraine&#8217;s relations with Western countries, particularly in the area of security policy, will not be deepened. The fact that this conflict of interests exists at the strategic level makes it difficult to build mutual trust. That is to say, the West wants its neighbours to be stable and highly developed, while Russia wants its neighbours to be weak and therefore easily influenced. Mutual mistrust can be mitigated by cooperation in other areas and gradually expanded, thus demonstrating a willingness to build constructive relations, but this does not address the root cause of mistrust. The war is caused by Russia&#8217;s foreign policy, and long-term peace inherently requires a change in Russia&#8217;s political outlook, which is not something that is currently on the table and is also viewed sceptically by the Ukrainian public.
The above mentioned factors illustrate the complexity of the negotiation process and the path to it. Each of the factors involve several aspects and considerations which are dynamic and dependent on processes both within and outside the belligerents. The factors may be complementary or even mutually exclusive, making the overall situation dynamic, and therefore inherently impossible to predict the initiation, progress and successful conclusion of the negotiation process with certainty. It is important to stress that negotiations and an active war are not mutually exclusive - they can take place simultaneously, thus influencing the negotiating positions. The negotiation process can be influenced by third parties, but the final say on the outcome and implementation of the negotiated terms belongs to Russia and Ukraine.
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This article by the Constitution Protection Bureau is published in a series of articles on various topics that are current in society. The purpose of the series of articles is to provide expertise on important issues for Latvian society, in order to supplement the informational space with reliable information that would serve the citizens as an explanation of current processes in the country and a forecast for their development.

Prospects for Russia – Ukraine peace talks

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