Egils Zviedris 
Director of the Constitution Protection Bureau
In April 12th, 2025, the Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB), marks its 30th anniversary. Established in the spring of 1995, by a decision of the Latvian Parliament, Saeima, SAB’s history coincides with the rebirth of our country. In the early 1990s, Latvian foreign and defence policy was focused on dismantling the remnants of Soviet occupation – working towards the withdrawal of the Russian army from Latvia (which concluded in 1998) and reintegration into the Western community. It was clear that Russia, the heir to the USSR, could re-emerge as a threat to our national security, once it had recovered from the economic and political damage caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The Constitution Protection Bureau was created as a completely new intelligence service, without the experience, culture and “values” of the State Security Committee (KGB). A decision, which, at the time, draw a lot of criticism. There were quite a few suggestions that a lot could be gained by employing the experienced KGB “professionals” loyal to Latvia. However, looking back, it is clear that the right call was made. Unlike other countries in the region, Latvia managed to minimize the risks of espionage arising from the corporate connections of Soviet-era KGB officers. Yet, creating a brand new institution had its own challenges, while acquiring knowledge from Western partners, building our capabilities, and seeking and developing our own areas of expertise.
Getting rid of the Soviet legacy was an important condition for building bilateral relations with Western intelligence and security services. Cooperation between intelligence services is based on mutual trust, which has to be built through tireless and consistent actions over a long period of time. Even the title and legal status of the SAB reflect the principles of a democratic state. Constitution Protection Bureau is submitted to the constitution and the rule of law, rather than a particular state official, as it is characteristic for authoritarian countries. The political balance, neutrality and objectivity in SAB’s relations to other government institutions and appointed officials is also ensured by the requirement for the director of SAB to be confirmed by the majority of the Saeima.
The Centre for Documentation of the Consequences of Totalitarianism, which is part of the SAB, also played a significant role in dismantling the Soviet legacy. SAB ensured the preservation and collection of KGB documents, which allowed for the legal and moral rehabilitation of people who had been spied on, persecuted and repressed by the “cheka”. In accordance with the requirements of the law “On Preservation and Use of Documents of the State Security Committee (KGB) and on Establishment of the Fact of Collaboration with the KGB”, SAB digitized the KGB documents. In 2019, the materials were transferred to National Archives of Latvia for permanent storage, where they are currently available on the archive’s website.
Over the years, the SAB developed its capabilities to ensure the protection of classified information. Effective protection of classified information enhances public confidence in government authorities and assures foreign partner services that the provided information is adequately protected. These factors were essential for the establishment of the National Security Authority in 2003, which was a mandatory requirement for Latvia’s membership in NATO and the European Union. Each member state must establish an authority supervising the protection of classified information. These requirements are also related to the SAB’s obligation to conduct counterintelligence in accordance with NATO and European Union standards. The procedures for protection of NATO and European Union classified information implemented in Latvia are regularly checked and positively assessed during inspections by the Security Office of the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union and NATO Office of Security, which is a high assessment of our work.
Security clearances for access to classified information have always attracted a lot of public and political attention. Vetting for access to national classified information is carried out by all three state security institutions, while security clearances for access to Latvian national TOP SECRET information are issued only by SAB, based on the vetting carried out by all three state security institutions. Looking back over the past years, SAB has denied TOP SECRET security clearances for officials representing the entire political spectrum. In my opinion, this clearly shows the professionalism and political neutrality of SAB, rejecting the occasional claims of “political incompetence”, “supporting the ruling parties” or “maintaining a police state”. From time to time, the principles and procedures for protection of classified information have been scrutinized by the public for various reasons, however, today’s rapidly changing geopolitical situation has shown that the current procedures allow us to prevent or minimize internal security risks.
Nowadays, collective decision-making requires increasing cooperation between intelligence and security services, making international cooperation an important aspect of the SAB’s activities. Latvian foreign and security policy is focused on European and transatlantic cooperation within the framework of NATO. This entails a number of international responsibilities and obligations.
After Latvia’s accession to NATO, 2011 was a particularly important year in the history of the SAB. Our service chaired a newly established NATO structure – the Civil Intelligence Committee, which unites more than 40 intelligence services. Latvia (SAB) was the first presiding country in this format, which continues to operate today. After discussions among member states and an assessment of the existing system, a decision was made to reform the structure of NATO bodies – several committees were closed, reduced or merged. The member states agreed to expand and modernize the NATO intelligence system. Within the framework of NATO, the SAB conducts extensive cooperation in the areas of intelligence, counterintelligence and protection of classified information. We have always been guided by the principle that we are part of NATO, instead of viewing it as an external structure. To this day, cooperation between intelligence services of NATO nations belongs to the foundation of Latvian security.
We have, occasionally, encountered criticism regarding the SAB’s allegedly slow or ineffective activities. In many cases, the specific nature of our work and the legislative restrictions do not allow us to reveal the full reasoning behind the decisions made. However, I would like to emphasize that SAB has always acted and will continue to act in the best interests of Latvian national security.
Without national security there can be no independence or even existence of our country. No matter what the future might bring, we are ready and determined to protect the security of Latvia.
It is our greatest honour to serve Latvia!
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30 Years Guarding National Security

On February 17, the Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB) publishes the unclassified part of the annual report for the year 2024. Along with last year&#8217;s analysis, SAB also provides forecast on the possible development of current security issues.
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, European countries have faced a new but increasingly significant threat – sabotage, diversions and physical attacks on targets in Europe by Russian intelligence and security services. In 2024, cases of Russian-organized sabotage have significantly increased, affecting more and more European countries. The new trend confirms that Russia is already having a direct confrontation with the West.
Russian intelligence and security services are currently developing their capabilities to organize sabotage in Europe. It is part of Moscow’s preparation for a possible military confrontation with NATO in the long term. The current concentration of Russian military resources in Ukraine makes the likelihood of a direct Russian-NATO military confrontation in 2025 rather low. However, if the war would become “frozen” and Russia would no longer have to suffer significant losses during the active hostilities in Ukraine, Moscow would be able to increase its military presence next to NATO’s north-eastern flank, including the Baltics within the next 5 years. This scenario would significantly increase Russia’s military threat to NATO, states the report.
“When facing a potential external threat, it is particularly important to maintain domestic stability and resilience. This applies at all levels, from the individual to the political, including the international arena. The decision-makers must think strategically, considering the long-term developments and security context. To maintain our security, we must develop our strength - no one tries to attack the strong and self-confident,” emphasizes Egils Zviedris, director of SAB, commenting on the current security challenges.
The classified part of the annual report will be reviewed by the Cabinet of Ministers and the National Security Commission of the Parliament of Latvia. Thereby the directions of the activities of the Constitution Protection Bureau for the year 2025 will be approved.
The full text of the report is available <a href="/files/uploads/2025/02/SAB-gada-parskats_2024_ENG.pdf">here</a>.
It is also possible to find out about the annual report, as well as other information disseminated by SAB on the social network X: @SAB_LV.
SAB report provides an overview of counter-intelligence, cyber security, intelligence and classified information protection issues in 2024. The report also includes an assessment of domestic and foreign policy developments in Russia and Belarus in 2024, taking into account the particularly active efforts of the special services of these countries to influence the EU and NATO countries, including Latvia.

Russia is purposefully developing its capabilities to confront NATO, Constitution Protection Bureau states, publishing its annual report

The Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Latvia and The Government of the Netherlands concerning Security Measures for the Protection of Classified Information was signed on 15 January 2025. The text of the Agreement was drafted by the Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB) in cooperation with the competent authorities of the Netherlands. The Agreement was signed by the Latvian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ms Baiba Braže, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Mr Caspar Veldkamp.
There is no valid agreement between Latvia and the Netherlands on protection of classified Information, therefore the signing of the agreement is essential for the cooperation, especially in the field of security and defense.
The agreement establishes a unified and detailed framework for the processing and protection of classified information, which is an important aspect for the cooperation between both countries, especially in military and economic field. The new regulation will also allow companies that have been granted facility security clearances to participate in classified tenders of the other country.
As the National Security Authority, SAB represents Latvia in the negotiation process of bilateral security agreements. It can take a long time to align two different regulatory frameworks for protection of classified information and ratification of agreements. The drafting of the particular lasted for several years.

Agreement between Latvia and the Netherlands on Protection of Classified Information was signed on 15 January 2025

The Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Latvia and The Government of the United States of America concerning Security Measures for the Protection of Classified Information was signed on 12 December 2024. The text of the Agreement was drafted by the Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB) in cooperation with the competent authorities of the US. The Agreement was signed by the Latvian Minister of Justice, Ms Inese Lībiņa-Egnere, and US Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Republic of Latvia, Mr Christopher Robinson.
The Agreement establishes a unified and detailed framework for the processing and protection of classified information, which is an essential aspect of the increasing political, military and economic cooperation between both countries. Exchange of classified information is particularly important for a full-fledged defence cooperation, enabling a common perception of threats, and provision of military and technical support. The new regulation will also allow companies that have been granted facility security clearances to participate in classified tenders of the other country (e.g. Latvian companies will now be able to participate in US tenders involving classified information).
As the National Security Authority, SAB represents Latvia in the negotiation process of bilateral security agreements. It can take a long time to align two different regulatory frameworks for protection of classified information and ratification of agreements. The drafting of the Latvian-US Agreement lasted for several years.
The entering into force of the new Agreement will terminate the Latvian-US Agreement for protection of classified military information, concluded in 1998.
SAB is currently negotiating security agreements with the Netherlands, North Macedonia, Poland, Belgium, and Malta.

Agreement between Latvia and the United States of America on Protection of Classified Information was signed on 12 December 2024

On November 15, the new premises of the Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB) were officially opened.
Since the current working conditions of SAB, including the location of structural units, created more and more challenges for ensuring NATO and EU security standards in order to realize the full performance of SAB&#8217;s functions, a building located in the vicinity of Brasa was renovated for SAB&#8217;s needs.
The building and the area adjacent to it are a part of the former War Hospital building complex. This complex is an architectural monument of national significance "Hospital building and park", where historical evidence has been preserved, combining them with security requirements corresponding to the service.
“May the war doctors who served here, who once protected and restored the health of wounded soldiers, serve as an example to the employees of the Constitution Protection Bureau, fulfilling their official duties and protecting the country of Latvia, its independence and security," emphasized Egils Zviedris, director of SAB, when opening the new service premises.
The restoration and reconstruction project of this building was developed for the needs of SAB in 2017. The works were started in the fall of 2020. Before the reconstruction started, the building was not operated and since 2012 it had been standing empty. Taking into account the critical state of the building&#8217;s structures, large-scale dismantling works were carried out, building new floor coverings, roof structures and roof, windows and doors, as well as installing new communications.
A special testimony to the fact that the building once housed a military hospital are the names of the medical facilities located in the premises. The rooms are named after the seven prominent doctors of the military hospital, colonels and generals, who managed this medical complex from 1919 to 1940. These names will continue to remind us of the role of Latvian army officers and the importance of this place in the history of Latvia.
SAB&#8217;s legal address is Straumes iela 1, Riga, but visitors and couriers should use the entrance from Upes iela to enter SAB&#8217;s territory. According to the service’s specifics, the premises of the SAB service are not publicly accessible. The only areas where visitors are allowed are several meeting and interview rooms.
Communication with SAB remains in its current form - by phone, e-mail or, with prior agreement on a visit, in person. SAB administrative phone number: 67025407, e-mail: pasts@sab.gov.lv. Detailed contact information is available on the SAB&#8217;s website <a href="https://sab.gov.lv/en/contact-us/">www.sab.gov.lv</a>.
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Photo: SAB
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Photo: Ilmārs Znotiņš

The new premises of the Constitution Protection Bureau have been officially opened

One of the most frequently discussed topics in the context of the Ukrainian war for more than two and a half years is the potential peace talks. Calls from politicians and officials to come to the negotiating table regularly appear in the media, offering various plans that could serve as a basis for peace talks, including from countries not directly involved in the hostilities. Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, there have even been several rounds of talks between Russia and Ukraine through various mediators, but so far these have not produced results beyond POW exchanges. In this context, attention must be paid to the factors that influence the likelihood of peace talks and their potential outcome.
While two countries are directly involved in the war, the indirect impact of the war affects a much larger number of countries. This means that the course of the war, and thus the opening of peace negotiations, can be directly or indirectly influenced by other countries. Given the dynamics of war, the political positions of states can change in the context of war, resulting in a set of interrelated factors influencing peace negotiations, which are discussed further below.
Strategic factors
The primary factor directly influencing the willingness and interest of the parties to enter negotiations is the situation at the frontlines. In the context of war, the belligerents make a calculation as to which instruments are better suited to achieve the desired objectives in the given situation. Confidence in one&#8217;s ability to achieve political objectives through military means reduces the interest in entering negotiations and risks undermining the maximum gains that can achieved by having the initiative on the battlefield. What is happening on the battlefield is an important consideration for negotiating positions: superiority and initiative at the front mean a greater ability to impose terms on the other side, as the weaker side is more inclined to cease hostilities. Consequently, the initiation and development of peace negotiations requires an understanding on the part of the parties involved that this is an acceptable instrument for protecting their interests and achieving their objectives.
In the context of the peace talks, it is important to highlight the Istanbul peace talks between Russia and Ukraine, which took place in April 2022 and were mediated by Turkey. During the negotiations, the parties reached an initial agreement on Ukraine&#8217;s future status - military neutrality, reduced armed forces, but with the possibility of joining the European Union (EU), while the status of Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk would be addressed in further negotiations. The so-called Istanbul Communiqué is a draft agreement to which Russian officials, including Vladimir Putin, regularly refer to in their statements. In this way, Russia is attempting to portray itself as ready for negotiations, while referring to a narrative that no longer reflects the current situation. The actual concessions made by Ukraine were influenced by the local and international context: only a month and a half since the start of the full-scale invasion, there was uncertainty about Ukraine&#8217;s ability to defend itself successfully, as well as about the willingness and ability of Western countries to provide Ukraine with the necessary military and economic support. Ukraine&#8217;s willingness to compromise was also influenced by the disclosure of crimes committed by the Russian Armed Forces in the occupied territories, which had repercussions for both Ukrainian and Western societies: it became clear what the population in other occupied territories would be subjected to, while reinforcing the view that this should not be allowed to go unpunished.
The second factor influencing the start, progress and ultimately the implementation of peace talks is the support of the societies involved. Public attitudes towards peace negotiations confer legitimacy on the officials who participate in the negotiation process on behalf of the state, and public support, or lack thereof, reflects not only on the domestic political situation, but also on the state&#8217;s ability to implement the agreement. This issue is particularly important for Ukraine, whose democratic system allows the people to express their opinion and thus their approval for a ceasefire or a negotiated end to the war. Sociological data from March of 2024 illustrate a complex situation, with 43% of the public in favour of negotiating peace with Russia. However, the majority of the public opposes the idea of renouncing EU or NATO membership and is categorically opposed to the proposal to reduce the size and capabilities of the Ukrainian armed forces. The data also show that the Ukrainian public would not be prepared to accept what they see as an unjust peace, with most of the population acknowledging their preparedness to demand a change of government in such a situation.
The peace negotiation process thus brings with it a complex domestic political dimension, in which society participates as a stakeholder in the debate on what constitutes a just peace. A negotiated settlement without public support can foster feelings of resentment and grievance, which in turn can manifest itself not only domestically but also in foreign policy settings, for example by calling for an aggressive or revanchist foreign policy. In this context, the depolitisation of Russian society, combined with the state&#8217;s monopoly on the information space, means that the public is potentially more willing to accept the Kremlin&#8217;s position. Ending the war without a complete capitulation of Ukraine would provoke resistance in some parts of society, but the general tendency of Russian society to accommodate the Kremlin&#8217;s positions would prevail, complemented by the range of repressive instruments available to the Kremlin. It should be stressed that ending the war poses significant long-term domestic political challenges for Russia, for example in terms of demobilisation of soldiers or state budget planning.
The domestic political situation in Western countries is a much-discussed factor. Ukraine&#8217;s position in the war is closely linked to the political resources of its international partners, and consequently the mood of Western publics, including the elites, towards Ukraine which can directly exert pressure in favour of an early start of peace talks and a quicker compromise. Ukraine is clearly aware of its position and part of its public diplomacy since February 2022 has been aimed directly at Western societies with the aim of explaining why Ukraine needs to be supported. One of Ukraine&#8217;s objectives in invading the Kursk region in the summer of 2024 was precisely to demonstrate its offensive capabilities in order to prevent the view of Ukraine losing taking root. However, recent domestic political developments in some Western countries show that the slogan of the need to cut aid to Ukraine is not a marginal one. In the recent regional parliamentary elections in Germany, parties whose rhetoric, among other promises, advocates normalisation of relations with Russia and a halt to military support for Ukraine made significant gains in two states. The opinion of Western societies points to a potential vulnerability - risk tolerance. Russia has a higher risk tolerance, i.e., a willingness to risk escalation that stems from Russia&#8217;s foreign policy principles. Russia has demonstrated this, for example, by conducting nuclear saber-rattling. In contrast, the logic of Western action is focused on escalation control and the need to avoid unplanned escalation. Russia has long sought to exploit this asymmetry against Western societies, and there is no reason to believe that Russia will stop it any time soon, even though it has not yet brought any clear benefits.
Far-reaching consequences
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is also very important in the context of the international political system. Russia has repeatedly postulated that its foreign policy is aimed at changing the existing rule-based international system into a multi-polar one. Peace negotiations leading to the legitimisation of Russia&#8217;s control over the occupied territories of Ukraine would create a dangerous precedent in which unprovoked aggression by a nuclear power, also including war crimes, would not be stopped or clearly punished. Although such a precedent would not mean an immediate repetition of the scenario elsewhere in the world, but it would seriously undermine the credibility and prestige of the current international system, especially the Western powers as the main enforcers of the international rules. It would, in fact, demonstrate that it is possible to unleash aggression and then force the victim to make concessions without adequate punishment. This is linked to a moral problem for Ukraine, namely that concessions to Russia would mean not only a legal renunciation of its own territories, but also of the Ukrainian citizens living in the occupied territories, who would thus lose hope and possibly a way of returning to Ukraine. The most fundamental problem would be precisely to make concessions to an aggressor state that has committed crimes against the Ukrainian people, and such concessions would have to be accepted not only by the Ukrainian society, but also by the Western.
One of the central issues in inter-state relations is the fulfilment of commitments. In the Ukrainian context, the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on security assurances in connection with Ukraine&#8217;s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons clearly illustrates this problem. This is an agreement signed by Ukraine, Russia, the UK and the US to provide Ukraine with security assurances in the context of its commitment to non-proliferation. The first point of the Memorandum is the signatories&#8217; guarantee to respect Ukraine&#8217;s independence, sovereignty and borders. Understandably, such recent experience with non-compliance is sensitive for Ukraine and affects its perception of other types of negotiations.
The Minsk agreements signed in 2014 and 2015 were aimed at stopping hostilities in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and creating a framework for resolving political and military issues. Practice has clearly shown that the implementation of agreements can be delayed and, in fact, sabotaged in the name of various interests. Ukraine&#8217;s experience also shows that the involvement of international observers does not guarantee the implementation of commitments if they do not have clear instruments of coercion at their disposal. The implementation of agreements and the willingness to comply are determined by the countries themselves, which can undermine national and public support for peace negotiations. Regarding Ukraine, the potential involvement of third parties in providing guarantees is sometimes considered, but this does not exclude the possibility that countries simply might not adhere to negotiated settlements.
The final problem, which forms the basis for any amicable settlement, is mutual mistrust. The negotiating parties, and especially the warring parties, must be able to trust the other side that the agreement will be honoured in the long term and lead to changes in policy and behaviour. Despite Russia’s different and conflicting explanations for the invasion’s objectives, long-term peace in Ukraine requires confidence that Russia will not use it to buy time and prepare for a new invasion. Similarly, Russia would need confidence that the sanctions imposed against it will be eased over time and that Ukraine&#8217;s relations with Western countries, particularly in the area of security policy, will not be deepened. The fact that this conflict of interests exists at the strategic level makes it difficult to build mutual trust. That is to say, the West wants its neighbours to be stable and highly developed, while Russia wants its neighbours to be weak and therefore easily influenced. Mutual mistrust can be mitigated by cooperation in other areas and gradually expanded, thus demonstrating a willingness to build constructive relations, but this does not address the root cause of mistrust. The war is caused by Russia&#8217;s foreign policy, and long-term peace inherently requires a change in Russia&#8217;s political outlook, which is not something that is currently on the table and is also viewed sceptically by the Ukrainian public.
The above mentioned factors illustrate the complexity of the negotiation process and the path to it. Each of the factors involve several aspects and considerations which are dynamic and dependent on processes both within and outside the belligerents. The factors may be complementary or even mutually exclusive, making the overall situation dynamic, and therefore inherently impossible to predict the initiation, progress and successful conclusion of the negotiation process with certainty. It is important to stress that negotiations and an active war are not mutually exclusive - they can take place simultaneously, thus influencing the negotiating positions. The negotiation process can be influenced by third parties, but the final say on the outcome and implementation of the negotiated terms belongs to Russia and Ukraine.
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Prospects for Russia – Ukraine peace talks

From now on the legal address of the Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB) will be Straumes street 1, Riga.
Communication with SAB remains as previously - by phone, e-mail or in person, arranging the visit in advance. SAB’s administrative phone number: 67025407, e-mail: pasts@sab.gov.lv. Detailed contact information is available <a href="https://sab.gov.lv/en/contact-us/">here</a>.
To enter the territory, visitors and couriers should use the entrance from the side of Upes street.
When visiting SAB premises, an identity document (passport or ID card) must be presented and a security check passed.
It is forbidden to carry into the SAB&#8217;s premises the mobile phones, other devices and equipment to record, save, transmit, or receive information, as well as weapons and any objects or substances that can be used for attack and can pose a threat to a person&#8217;s life, health or property.
The devices and items carried with the visitor will be securely stored in a special locker during the visit.
The service is moving to the new premises gradually. The official opening will follow.

New address for the Constitution Protection Bureau

Ever since Vladimir Putin became President of Russia in 1999, there has been a gradual increase in repression of democratic freedoms and rights in Russia and a centralization of decision-making. With the strengthening of authoritarianism, there has been an increased tendency to use ideological explanations for legitimization of this process. For example, portraying Russia as a so-called “sovereign democracy” and thus explaining the limitations of individual rights and freedoms in Russia. In recent years, especially since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, there has been increased ideologization to explaining and justifying the domestic and foreign political activities of Russia’s ruling regime and offering a certain narrative about the relationship between the society and the ruling elite. At the same time the ideologization process does not mean that there exists a single, unified ideology in Russia.
One area where ideologization is evident is Russia&#8217;s international role. Traditionally, Russia&#8217;s international status and role is based on the legacy of the Russian Empire and the USSR. It is possible to observe the selective use of historical examples to highlight Russia&#8217;s importance to European security, such as the role of the Russian Empire in defeating Napoleon in the early 19th century, and particularly the role played by the USSR in the victory over Nazi Germany in World War II. More similarities with the USSR&#8217;s ideology have been emerging since 2014 as tensions in Russia&#8217;s relations with the West intensified. Antagonism towards the West, has been placed at the heart of modern Russia&#8217;s geopolitical view and is manifested in several sectors.
In the rhetoric of senior Russian officials, using NATO expansion and Western aid to Ukraine as examples, the West is portrayed as Russia&#8217;s primary security threat. Western aggressive security policy is contrasted with Russia&#8217;s supposedly constructive and open approach, for example by offering to be part of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. Western and especially U.S. aggression toward Russia is illustrated through their arms deliveries to Ukraine, including the supply of weapons systems to be used against targets on Russian soil and allowing strikes to take place.
The West is being positioned as a threat to Russia&#8217;s “unique values”. Russian society is told that Russia is the only guardian of Russian values. Much of the public rhetoric is devoted to emphasizing the special place of Russia&#8217;s supposedly unique culture, values and even Russia as a specific civilization in the world, while maintaining these principles relatively abstract and therefore applicable at selected opportunities. Given Russia&#8217;s geopolitical positioning, it is often accentuated that the struggle with the West is not just political or military, but ideologically existential. It is not only Russia&#8217;s political survival, but Russia&#8217;s survival as a civilization, that is at stake. It is important to emphasize that in its civilizational view Russia considers not only Russian citizens, but also compatriots living outside Russia. Consequently, Russia&#8217;s political and ideological confrontation with the West is framed for internal society as an existential battle for the survival of Russia as a nation and civilization, confronting an aggressive and imperialist West.
Russia&#8217;s role as the guardian of “unique Russian values” and civilization is important for mobilizing the country&#8217;s society and justifying the authoritarian political regime. As a necessity to protect the public against Western “aggression” and values, the creation of an appropriate highly centralized decision-making system has also been enshrined in amendments to the Russian constitution in 2012 and 2020, fortifying what is known as the vertical of power with Vladimir Putin as a key figure.
With Russia&#8217;s invasion of Ukraine, the cult of Putin&#8217;s personality as Russia&#8217;s leader has become increasingly apparent. Putin&#8217;s stay in power has been tied to Russia&#8217;s survival and stability, while his re-election as President is a testament and public legitimacy to the decisions he has made. Putin&#8217;s own image has become inextricably linked to the qualities and objectives, interests and mission attributed to Russia in the international system. Within the country, Putin is designed as a guarantor for the economic stability and development of society and embodies Russia&#8217;s values - traditionality, Christianity and development. Russian authorities and the political elite which includes both those close to the President and a wider range of officials whose prosperity is directly linked to the regime are being consolidated around Putin&#8217;s personality.
In the current ideological construct Russia’s society has been allocated the role of supporting political elite and its worldview and given the opportunity to participate in the fight for Russia&#8217;s unique values and the protection of its civilization. This manifestation of Russian patriotism includes the concept of a “hero&#8217;s death” (preparedness to sacrifice) highlighted in Kremlin propaganda messages related to the invasion of Ukraine. In exchange for supporting the regime and its interests, the Russian “social contract” of Putin&#8217;s time provides stability in the country and protection from the threats imagined by the Kremlin, as well as the possibility for individuals to be part of Russian society, that is portrayed as rooted in history, united and superior in terms of values and morals to others.
The transformation of the country&#8217;s economy has become a priority in Russian politics. This is determined by the resources needed to wage war in the Ukraine and the impact of international sanctions. The ability of Russian domestic producers to offer better products in terms of quality and price than Western ones is increasingly emphasized in Russia’s public space. This is used to highlight Russia&#8217;s ability to develop not only the economy, but to create an economic model and financial system that is independent and self-sufficient in the long-term.
The high degree of control of the information space in Russia provides a favorable environment for ideologization to take place. The regime also dominates the cultural space – media, film and theatre, books – by introducing censorship and restrictions on the distribution of certain authors works. There is a growing focus on youth indoctrination, including the realization of patriotic education in schools and universities based on a politicized interpretation of Russian history and so-called traditional values (stemming from Orthodox and other cultural and historical aspects). Russia&#8217;s education policies demonstrate a strategy that includes political propaganda, such as demonstrating Putin&#8217;s official addresses, military training and the promotion of aggression against gender, sexual, ethnic, racial, religious groups. Students are taught “politically correct” history and support is being given to behaviors that include censorship of the views of “foreign agents,” or denial of liberal-democratic values, and full acceptance of the state&#8217;s teachings.
Russia&#8217;s ideological tendencies mark the vectors of Russian policy development. The antagonistic approach to international policy, especially in relation to Western countries, illustrates Russia&#8217;s readiness for further confrontation, not only in the field of security and economics, but also in the field of values. As Russia&#8217;s invasion of Ukraine continues, Russia will tend to build cooperation with non-Western countries, primarily to mitigate economic losses and form a group of anti-Western countries. The inclusion of the Russian diaspora into Russian civilization, in turn, provides the basis for Russia to continue to present itself as the defender of the diasporas living outside Russia and of everything Russian, implying potential interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
Internally, ideologization is focused on the stability and survival of Russia&#8217;s regime, not the broader Russian state or society. The interests of the ruling regime have become the interests of the state, but the primary guardian of these interests – Vladimir Putin – has been placed at the center of it. Such an ideological construct illustrates the leading regime&#8217;s interest in maintaining its positions also under war conditions, giving the public the illusion of no alternatives. The investments made in the indoctrination of young people show the willingness to maintain its power position in the long-term as well and to dissuade the strength of the political opposition. The intensification of ideologization in Russia may signal the regime&#8217;s efforts to create additional resources for mobilization and its legitimization for the society in the face of a gradual socio-economic decline. At the same time, the regime&#8217;s control over political, economic processes and the information space makes it possible to adapt elements of ideological content to changes in external or internal situations.
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This article by the Constitution Protection Bureau is published in a series of articles on various topics that are current in society. The purpose of the series of articles is to provide expertise on important issues for Latvian society, in order to supplement the informational space with reliable information that would serve the citizens as an explanation of current processes in the country and a forecast for their development.

Russia`s ideologization: building self-sufficient empire

Recently in the public space there has been widespread information on Russia`s activities in the hybrid spectrum, including activities in EU and NATO Member States to reduce support for Ukraine, destabilize the unity of Wester countries and increase polarization in societies.
According to most recent National Security Concept of Latvia, the range of hybrid threats includes economic, including energy, blackmail, as well as interference in the fields of science, finance and education. Hybrid activities are carried out with the aim of weakening Western unity, democratic values, decision-making and overall ability to resist or obstruct aggressors’ activities. Hybrid activities tend to break down the boundaries between war and peace, use open and hidden tools, and changes the intensity of the activities carried out as necessary.
Russia has used a wide range of open and hidden instruments to achieve its political objectives in the past, such as supplies of natural gas, access to the Russian market, the dissemination of narratives on traditional information channels such as TV or the use of troll and bot armies and targeted information to influence users of social networks. In other regions of the world, such as Africa, private military companies closely associated with the Russian Ministry of Defence are active, providing support for the preservation of the power of African regimes, allowing Russia to strengthen its political and economic positions in the region, including by finding new markets for the sale of Russian-made armaments.
Mapping of anti-European hybrid activities
As most European countries are members of NATO and the EU, and with NATO&#8217;s growing defense and deterrence capabilities, the likelihood of open military confrontation by Russia diminishes. However, while Russia&#8217;s political elite and decision-making process remain unchanged, Russia&#8217;s interest in influencing European countries&#8217; decisions through hybrid activities will remain.
Since Russia&#8217;s widespread invasion of Ukraine, Russian hybrid activities in Europe have focused primarily on reducing support for Ukraine and hindering the strengthening of defense capabilities in the Baltic Sea region. To achieve these objectives, Russia is taking measures to reduce European unity, to intensify internal political tensions within European countries and to create/increase instability.
Russian hybrid activities are deployed in the European region and cover a number of “domains” such as information and cyber domain; military; intelligence and active measures; political and diplomatic; the economic and legal domains.
The use of the information domain to spread narratives of the so called “Russian world” and discrediting the positions of western countries is one of most visible examples of hybrid activities by Russia. Russian activities in the information domain are carried out in an open and hidden manner.
In an open way, Russia continues to build and disseminate messages supporting its position, using information channels primarily created for internal Russian consumption, such as regime-controlled television, internet, radio channels and the print press, as well as information channels for external audiences such as “Sputnik news”. Covert activities include targeted campaigns on social networks, including usage of bots and trolls or a “fake news platforms”, such as recently sanctioned “Voice of Europe”, to spread messages beneficial to Russia and as a cover for other forms of active measures, including influencing European elections. 
In a hidden way, Russia has developed activities in social communication networks such as telegram, using these networks not only to disseminate its messages, but to gather information and recruit Russian supporters.
Latvia and other European countries continue to face high cyber threats from Russia and its supporting hacktivist groups. DDoS attacks are continuing against Latvia, targeting public institutions, critical infrastructure and service providers, including financial, transport and communications providers and private companies. Cyber-attacks are continuing on companies that provide support, especially companies providing software development and maintenance services, with the aim of gaining indirect access to their customer networks.
There are examples of attacks by Russian or related hacktivist groups on media service providers, such as temporarily taking control of media channel to post pro-Russia content.
In the military domain in the Baltic Sea region, Russia continues to implement activities to gather intelligence on the development of military capabilities of Baltic Sea region States and cooperation within NATO, including following up on allied military exercises and movement of military units. Aggressive behavior by Russian jets near NATO-allied ships and planes is seen episodically, which could lead to an unplanned collisions. Active disruption of the Global Positioning System (GPS) in the Baltic Sea region continues, in order to limit attacks by Ukrainian drones in western areas of Russia, while also increasing the risks to civil aviation in the Baltic Sea region.
The military environment is hit by active Russian nuclear rhetoric, which is used as a tool to deter the West from providing military assistance to Ukraine (especially supplies of new weapons systems) and increasing presence in NATO&#8217;s eastern flank. Russia&#8217;s nuclear rhetoric highlights tactical nuclear weapons, the threshold for use of which is lower than for strategic nuclear weapons, to potentially deter Western countries from strengthening support for Ukraine.
The so-called private military companies, which, despite their legal status, are closely linked to Russian “Power ministries”, maintain their role as an instrument to defend Russia&#8217;s external interests. The use of mercenary companies is primarily observed in Africa, where the activities of these companies are aimed at strengthening the security and position of the ruling regimes, in exchange for access to the economic sectors of the respective countries, especially mining. Its mercenary presence in African countries allows Russia to strengthen relations with those countries, which is particularly important in the face of isolation from Western countries. Improving relations can also increase Russia&#8217;s chances of gaining support or reducing resistance to its initiatives in the UN.
Active Russian intelligence activities are still ongoing in Europe. European and other Western countries have taken and continue to take steps to illuminate and deport Russian intelligence officers, as well as identifying and detaining so-called “illegals,” or Russian spies with long-established false identities. Under these circumstances, Russian intelligence activities have been hindered, but not stopped as Russia is adapting and looking for new ways to obtain intelligence.
Russian security services have demonstrated readiness to implement so-called active measures to support the country&#8217;s interests, including in NATO Member States. Since Russia&#8217;s widespread invasion of Ukraine, the primary objective of the active measures has been to reduce support to Ukraine, including through sabotage activities against infrastructure used to store and transport aid to Ukraine. Such measures seek to prevent Ukraine from receiving the goods it needs, as well as to psychologically influence and deter aid organizers. 
Hybrid activities in the political environment are focused on influencing the decision-making process in Russia&#8217;s favor. To this end, Russia has used interests and political groups as lobbyists or direct actors in political processes. In the case of political parties or certain candidates, Russia has used other hybrid arsenal tools in the past, to support parties and candidates, such as information channels under its control or economic tools and illegal financing to strengthen political power positions. In this way, Russia is crippling the political systems of democratic countries to ensure that more Russia-friendly political forces come to power or maintain it.
In the economic environment, Russia&#8217;s traditional hybrid activities have involved using energy resources to “reward” countries supporting Russia and “punish” its opponents. Similarly, access to the Russian market has been used. Since February 24, 2022, the presence of Russian energy resources in European national markets has decreased significantly, as has trade volumes in other commodity groups, thereby reducing Russia&#8217;s ability to use these types of instruments. At the same time, it is still evident that the most Russia-friendly European countries continue to receive energy resources from Russia. Since 2022, the Baltic States have taken significant measures to prevent energy dependence on Russia. Currently, the highest risks to the energy sector are related to electricity management lines, with Baltic States and Russia connected to BRELL network. Risks will ease with the planned desynchronization in 2025.
Nationals of several Western countries have been detained in Russia in recent years, citing various types of violation as reasons. In this way, Russia aims to improve its position in discussions with Western countries so that these detained nationals can be “exchanged” for concessions beneficial to Russia or for Russian nationals detained in the West. Russia also continues to use other types of legal instruments, such as prosecuting cases and issuing arrest warrants, to target its citizens outside Russia and other critics of the regime. Such arrest warrants have been issued for several deputies of the Latvian Saeima and increase the risks for these persons if the visit Russia-friendly countries, where Russia may request the detention of these persons. Russia continues selective approach to international law to defend its interests, including criticizing the Baltic and other European countries for violating certain rights.
As a partial hybrid activity aimed at the use of the legal environment, there is the instrumentalization of migration implemented by Russia and Belarus, supporting and organizing migration flows across the borders of the European Union and tending to abuse the existing EU asylum procedures. Russia and Belarus aim to reinforce the weaponization of migration through activities in the information and political domain, accusing EU Member States of failing to comply with international law.
Conclusions and forecasts
With V. Putin&#8217;s authoritarian regime remaining in power in Russia and continued Russian aggression in Ukraine, as well as continued Western support for Ukraine, military and other assistance, Russia will continue to use hybrid activities against Europe and the West. The hybrid activities so far demonstrate Russia&#8217;s ability to operate in different environments and use different instruments. Trends over the past two years also show Russia&#8217;s ability to adapt its activities in response to retaliation by Western countries. At the same time, Russia is not always able to ensure high synchronization of hybrid activities, especially when activities fall under the competences of different institutions. In the past two years, the understanding of hybrid activities of Russia and other authoritarian countries and necessary retaliatory measures has also been significantly strengthened in Western countries.
Taking into account the wide spectrum of hybrid threats, the best way for timely identification, prevention, mitigation and forecasting of hybrid activities is cooperation and strengthening of resilience of the State institutions and non-governmental sector, which is already being implemented and refined in Latvia. In other Western countries, increasing awareness of hybrid threats strengthen international cooperation, thereby reducing the impact of hybrid activities on Western countries and societies.
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Russia`s hybrid threats: trends and developments

Russia&#8217;s relations with Western countries have gradually deteriorated since the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the start of hostilities in east of Ukraine. Further Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, which also included targeting civilians in conquered territories and targeted attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure, has further increased antagonism between the two sides.
Russia&#8217;s relations with NATO are particularly important within the framework of relations between Russia and the West. Historically, Russia has perceived NATO as a long-term threat. This is due to NATO as the world&#8217;s strongest defence alliance, as well as developments since the end of the Cold War, when most of the Eastern European countries chose to secure their defence through NATO membership. Such choices by European countries have reduced Russia&#8217;s ability to influence the politics of the countries concerned and led to a reduction in Russian influence in the region.
Eroding NATO&#8217;s role and presence in the Eastern Europe was central to Russia&#8217;s stated ultimatum to the US and Western nations in December 2021, when Russia had already begun widespread deployment of troops at Ukraine&#8217;s borders. Since the invasion began, anti-NATO statements have become part of the daily rhetoric of Russian officials. Part of the statements also include making a direct threat to the NATO alliance and its Member States.
How Russia will build further relations with NATO can be influenced by a combination of factors - Russia&#8217;s ability to rebuild its military and defence industry, Russia&#8217;s economic situation and political considerations. The further development of NATO&#8217;s defence and deterrence capabilities is equally important.
Russia&#8217;s military capabilities and their potential changes
About 360,000 troops took part in Russia&#8217;s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Russia has reportedly lost more than 315,000 troops (dead and wounded) since the invasion began, according to the publicly available information. Ukrainian sources show even higher Russian army losses - exceeding 400,000.
The significant loss of the Russian army is illustrated by the necessity for mobilization. As early as September 2022, Vladimir Putin signed a decree declaring partial mobilization to maintain the military&#8217;s combat capability. The recruiting of the fighters was also carried out by representatives of “private” military companies fighting in Ukraine, for example, “Wagner group" recruits their potential soldiers in Russian prisons.
The mobilization in Russia continues in a hidden way, as only in this way can the losses of live force in Ukraine be compensated. Mostly financial incentives such as salary that is above Russia&#8217;s average are used to attract young soldiers. Specific activities, including the involvement of law enforcement, are carried out to recruit in the armed forces migrants from Central Asian countries who have recently acquired Russian citizenship. Separate recruiting campaigns have also been caried out outside Russia in countries such as Syria, India, Cuba and Nepal. Repeated “open” mobilization has also not been ruled out as the war and Russia&#8217;s losses continue. In making the decision on mobilization, Russia&#8217;s leading elite will be guided by the situation on the front and the overall sentiment in society.
Along with the loss of soldiers, since the beginning of the war Ukrainian forces have managed to destroy a significant amount – up to 9,000 Russian military equipment, including tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and other types of weapons, as well as aircraft and ships. The largest losses of soldiers and machinery can be seen directly in the ground forces, with the Russian navy and air force maintaining relatively high fighting capabilities.
As Russia&#8217;s invasion of Ukraine prolongs, the role of the military-industrial complex in maintaining the fighting effectiveness of Russian forces is growing. Russia has been able to adapt its production to the needs of war in the short term - to ensure repair of damaged machinery, modernization and adaptation of reserve equipment, as well as production of various types of munitions, including artillery ammunition and missiles. As hostilities in Ukraine continue, Russia&#8217;s ability to rebuild and replenish its arsenal is expected to decline. Already, sanctions are making access to Western-made components difficult. More expensive components imported into Russia through third countries must be used in arms production, bypassing sanctions, or relying on alternatives made in China or other countries that may be of lower quality or require additional adjustment.
Russia&#8217;s military-industrial complex continues to face challenges from the workforce - especially the higher-skilled workforce - as well as challenges in motivating employees to continue working under high intensity conditions. Production capacity may be negatively affected by the depreciation of the infrastructure used in production and by limited access to the components necessary to restore the operation of the infrastructure. The diversion of the military-industrial complex&#8217;s resources to maintain the Russian military&#8217;s combat capability in Ukraine further limits the development and deployment of new military technologies, which in the medium term may increase the technological gap of Russian-made armaments from Western or Chinese-made armaments.
The war in Ukraine and the geopolitical changes it has caused in Europe have made it necessary for Russia to assess the appropriateness of the existing model of armed forces. As early as late 2022, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu issued a statement on reform of the Russian Armed Forces, directed at improving command and control of the military and increasing the number of units of the armed forces and personnel to 1.5 million by 2026. In the western direction, as part of the reform, on February 26, 2024, the military areas of Moscow and Leningrad, which had been merged into Western military district since 2010, were restored.
Given the hostilities in Ukraine and the losses of Russian soldiers and machinery, it can be predicted with high credibility that Russia will face the challenges of making actual changes to its armed forces by 2026 and fully establishing and arming existing and newly formed units. This will not prevent Russia from developing a perception on the progress of the reform of the armed forces in public statements. The reform process will allow Russia to maintain an aggressive position on NATO members bordering Russia.
Top Russian officials regularly come up with threats to use nuclear weapons, including linking them to the course of hostilities in Ukraine and support from Western countries. The threat of the use of nuclear weapons is being used more intensively by Russian officials in cases where the Ukrainian army has succeeded on the front, or when the political discussion in the western countries about providing new support to Ukraine activates. In the assessment of SAB, the nuclear threat is seen as Russian attempts to discourage Western countries from providing further support to Ukraine, as well as more active decisions to strengthen NATO, in particular to reinforce the presence of allies in the east of the alliance. Through aggressive nuclear rhetoric, Russia also tends to raise the alert level in Western societies. Overall Russia is unlikely to use nuclear weapons in the short and medium term. The use of nuclear weapons would certainly trigger a negative international response from countries that are currently neutral or Russia-friendly, such as China. The use of nuclear weapons would also further consolidate Western countries, as well as could even make it easier to supply new types of weapons systems to Ukraine.
Russia&#8217;s economic situation and political considerations in relations with NATO
Russia&#8217;s war in Ukraine and related sanctions have had a negative impact on Russia&#8217;s economy and access to foreign capital. At the same time, Russia continues to use the tools at its disposal to promote economic resilience. Currently, one of the pillars of Russia&#8217;s economy is its military-industrial complex, as well as its still high revenues from international hydrocarbon trade, including bypassing sanctions and trade restrictions. As the war in Ukraine continues, Russia will continue to adapt its economy to the needs of war, which on the one hand will allow hostilities and Russian army combat capabilities to be sustained, but in the medium term will reduce or even halt Russia&#8217;s economic growth. More about the Russian economic situation since the invasion of Ukraine is described in <a href="https://sab.gov.lv/en/news/russian-economy-in-ukraines-war-perspective-impact-and-forecasts/">the previous material, created by SAB</a>.
Russia&#8217;s invasion of Ukraine was planned as a fast-paced war in which Ukrainian resistance would be overcome in a short time, not as a more than two-year-long conflict for which Russia was not prepared, either militarily or economically. Given the course of the war, Russia has to reassess the potential course of potential future conflicts and assess the country&#8217;s ability to engage in and win such a conflict.
The primary interest of Putin’s regime is to consolidate or hold their positions of power. Russia&#8217;s domestic and foreign political activities are planned to take into account the above-mentioned interest, thereby making less likely activities that directly threaten the stability of the regime. On the one hand, the conflict situation can be used by the regime to further mobilize society, on the other hand, risks to the regime to remain in power increase in the event of losses. Risks to the regime may rise despite the regime&#8217;s vast propaganda apparatus, which is already unable to contain socially active groups of society such as groups of "soldier`s mothers" during the Ukraine war. The failed course of war in Ukraine, including Ukraine&#8217;s ability to resist much larger Russian forces, makes it necessary for the V.Putin regime to reassess Russia&#8217;s ability to manage the war and achieve the intended result. In the assessment of SAB in the short and medium term, Russia&#8217;s willingness to embark on an open conventional military confrontation with a stronger adversary like NATO is unlikely.
Maintaining the external threat is one of the most common instruments of public mobilization in authoritarian countries and used by the Russian political regime. NATO is described in Russia as an aggressive anti-Russian organization and, in the medium term, it is more beneficial for Russia to maintain NATO&#8217;s image as an aggressor, thus continuing to mobilize public support around the political regime. Russian officials will continue to spread messages about NATO&#8217;s threat as Russia, and the need to pursue confrontational policies from Russia, in its public communications with varying intensity.
Russia&#8217;s relationship with NATO and the possibility of confrontation should also be assessed in the context of other regional and global policy processes. Regionally, Russia&#8217;s invasion of Ukraine has reduced Russian influence in neighboring regions, such as the South Caucasus or Central Asian countries. An open confrontation with NATO is likely to force countries in the region to seek alternative lines of cooperation, thus reducing Russia&#8217;s role in the region. Russia&#8217;s invasion of Ukraine has increased Russia&#8217;s dependence on China. China continues to strengthen as Russia&#8217;s energy market and the presence of Chinese goods in Russian markets is increasing. As China&#8217;s economic growth continues, in a situation where Russia&#8217;s economy is stagnating, there is a high likelihood that Russia will have to pay more strategic attention to China and how to curb Russia&#8217;s increased dependence on China.
Invading Ukraine, V.Putin&#8217;s regime had relied on a lack of unity in the West and the differing views of Western countries in relations with Russia. However, the war has fostered Western unity and readiness to implement measures to rein in Russian aggression. In addition, the Russian invasion has facilitated a review of the defence policy of Western countries, especially European countries, with most countries taking decisions to increase defence capabilities in the coming years. One indicator is the diverted public funding for defence, for example 18 of the 32 NATO members will divert at least 2% of GDP to defence in 2024. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, NATO Member States&#8217; defence spending accounted for 57.8% of global spending in 2023, while Russian spending was 4.8%.
Since the invasion began, NATO has taken a series of significant practical steps to strengthen deterrence and defense capabilities, such as developing new regional plans. An important step in strengthening the alliance&#8217;s shared capabilities, especially in the Baltic Sea region, is the accession of Finland and Sweden to the alliance.
Conclusion
The pace of Russia&#8217;s invasion of Ukraine has raised questions about further scenarios for Russian action, including a possible open confrontation with Western countries, including NATO members. The announcements of reforms by Russian forces aimed at strengthening a military presence in the country&#8217;s western regions, the regular threat of nuclear weapons use from Russian officials, as well as the generally confrontational tone maintained by Russia, give the impression of the inevitability of an open military confrontation.
A review of Russia&#8217;s actual situation, in turn, shows a number of factors that do not support what has been expressed in Russia`s rhetoric. First, the primary task of Russia&#8217;s defence sector is winning the war in Ukraine, diverting most of the resources of the armed forces and military-industrial complex and the armaments reserves accumulated in previous years to this aim. Russia will need time to restore the weapons lost in the war, train soldiers as well as restore reserves. These actions will have to be taken in circumstances where the Russian economy will continue to face challenges and the country will have to assess which needs to divert scarce resources.
While V. Putin&#8217;s regime remains stable, the war in Ukraine has intensified pressure on the regime, including creating new kinds of risks for the regime, as the “Prigozhin’s coup” demonstrated in June 2023. The primary objective of the V.Putin`s regime is to maintain its power and while confrontational policies with the West contribute to the mobilization of society and support for the regime, the fact remains that further escalation or open military conflict can also have unpredictable consequences for the regime. According to the SAB’s assessment, in the short and medium term, the V.Putin`s regime will continue to maintain confrontational relations with Western countries and NATO, including the threat of escalation, including the use of nuclear weapons. Russia will most likely continue to use different types of hybrid methods against NATO members, including information and influence operations and cyber-attacks. At the same time, the probability of conventional military confrontation with Russia remains low.

Russia-NATO relations in the context of confrontation

Please find below Annual Public Reports of the Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB). Public reports partially contain the information which is included in SAB’s report to the Cabinet of Ministers of Latvia (the Government).

Neutralisation of activities of intelligence and security services unfriendly to Latvia.

Obtaining background information on activities of foreign institutions or persons against the interests of the Latvian state.

Issuance of special permits for access to state secrets. Protection of EU and NATO classified information.

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