The joint Russian-Belarusian strategic military exercise, "Zapad-2025," will take place from 12 to 16 September. The exercises will be held mainly on Belarusian territory, however the military activities are also planned for Kaliningrad and the newly re-established Moscow and Leningrad military districts. The officially announced objectives of "Zapad-2025" are to simulate joint defensive and offensive operations and to improve cooperation between the Russian and Belarusian armed forces. Although the Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB) assesses that the military exercises pose a low level of threat to Latvia and NATO, Russia and Belarus are using "Zapad-2025" in their domestic and foreign policy strategic communication.
For a domestic audience, the Putin regime is using the "Zapad-2025" exercises to clearly convey that, regardless of the war in Ukraine, Russia is capable of developing and strengthening its military capabilities and of responding to military threats. This message is well-received in the Russian and Belarusian information space, as it emphasizes the stability of the regimes, the existence of a reliable ally, and the defensive nature of the exercises. Simultaneously, it is used to accuse Western countries of aggressive foreign policy and of worsening the security situation in the region. This, in turn, fosters anti-Western sentiment in Russian society and justifies the Putin regime&#8217;s aggressive foreign policy, especially the war in Ukraine.
As "Zapad-2025" exercises are receiving increased attention, Russia is also crafting similar foreign policy messages – regardless of the war in Ukraine, Russia is capable of developing and strengthening its military presence at NATO&#8217;s borders. To increase the strategic significance of the exercise, Russia and Belarus also carries out tactical nuclear weapon drills and demonstrate their new military equipment. The Western countries are the primary target audience of these messages, as it clearly signals Russia&#8217;s extensive military capabilities, including its nuclear capabilities.
"Zapad-2025" exercises also highlight another feature of Russian and, especially, Belarusian strategic communication: both countries are portraying themselves as responsible and pragmatic neighbors who are forced to respond to threats created by Western countries. In May this year, Belarusian officials announced that the exercises would be moved from the Belarusian western border deeper into Belarusian territory and that the scale of the exercises would be reduced — officially, fewer than 13,000 participants will take part in the exercises in Belarus. Belarus also announced that, despite the reduced scale of the exercises, it still invites international observers, including from the Baltic states, to participate. According to Belarusian officials, the main goal of these actions was to show a willingness to de-escalate regional tensions.
However, this narrative of pragmatism was quickly turned against the Baltic states and Poland. Belarusian officials spread narratives that NATO (the Baltic states and Poland) are using "Zapad-2025" as a pretext for militarization, despite the seemingly demonstrated goodwill from Belarus and Russia in reducing the scale of the exercises and moving them further away from NATO borders.
It&#8217;s highly likely that as the active phase of "Zapad-2025" approaches, Russian and Belarusian statements will become louder and information campaigns against Latvia and NATO will increase. It is also very likely that Russian and Belarusian officials will pay a close attention to narratives disseminated in NATO&#8217;s information space with the aim of dramatizing them and using them in their own information campaigns.
Overall, the military threat posed by the exercises to Latvia and NATO is assessed as low — Russia&#8217;s military and political involvement in exercises is lower than in previous years, and Russian military resources remain concentrated on the war in Ukraine. At the same time, SAB encourages residents to be vigilant and report suspicious observations in the border area, such as communication disruptions, to the authorities.
This article by the Constitution Protection Bureau is published in a series of articles on various topics that are current in society. The purpose of the series of articles is to provide expertise on important issues for Latvian society, in order to supplement the informational space with reliable information that would serve the citizens as an explanation of current processes in the country and a forecast for their development.

Moscow and Minsk uses Zapad-2025 to exert information and psychological influence

Since regaining independence, Latvia has faced a gradual increase in Russia&#8217;s hybrid activities. These activities employ various non-military tools with a singular objective: to influence Latvia, its policies, and its society. Given Russia&#8217;s confrontational foreign policy and recent hybrid and conventional invasions of its neighbors, it&#8217;s crucial to understand how hybrid warfare can be used to prepare for broader conventional warfare.
One of the most common manifestations of Russia&#8217;s hybrid warfare in Latvia and the Baltic States is propaganda and disinformation and the associated information operations. These information operations aim to influence, or even change, the target audience&#8217;s values and beliefs in a way that favors Russia. Russia&#8217;s actions concerning Ukraine corroborate this. Before the full-scale invasion, extensive information campaigns sought to influence Ukrainian society, reducing its readiness to resist and making Russia appear more appealing. Therefore, Russian information campaigns are an indicator that can signal an escalation of relations, including, in their ultimate form, a readiness to use military aggression to achieve their goals.
However, when assessing Russia&#8217;s information activities and their effectiveness, it&#8217;s necessary to consider their intensity, the content of their messages, and their intended audiences. This helps answer a broader question: can such campaigns serve as a precursor to further escalation and even military confrontation? The significance of this question is amplified by Russia&#8217;s own understanding of hybrid warfare, where information campaigns may be followed by military activities to achieve influence over a target country&#8217;s strategic objectives.
Parameters of an indicator
The Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB) constantly monitors and analyzes Russian information influence campaigns and operations within its competence. Russia&#8217;s efforts regarding Latvia demonstrate long-standing trends. Compared to the period before Russia&#8217;s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the aggressiveness and intensity of Russian propaganda and disinformation directed at Latvia have increased.
When analyzing Russia&#8217;s influence activities against Latvia, SAB pays particular attention to the content and aggressiveness of the disseminated propaganda and disinformation. Most messages are reactive, with Russia responding to Latvia&#8217;s decisions and statements. Over the past three years, SAB has observed no new trends in Russian messages; instead, they have become part of existing disinformation trends. These largely include accusations of historical revisionism, promoting and using Russophobia and discriminatory measures, political aggression against Russia, and short-sighted submission to a Western-dictated political course.
In some cases, Russia&#8217;s information influence activities are also proactive. These often align with historically significant dates or events for Russia, as Russia seeks to proactively prepare the information space. For example, increased activity is observed annually around March 16 or May 9, when Russia raises issues concerning World War II and its course, resulting in accusations against Latvia and the Western world in general of historical revisionism and glorifying fascism and Nazism. Given the municipal elections scheduled for this weekend, SAB is also carefully monitoring Russian activities in the information space in this context.
Russian information activities are not static; they are characterized by their ability to adapt and utilize topics relevant to different audiences for greater effect. The intensity of Russian disinformation is high but stable, maintaining its consistently high level. Every month, dozens of publications and statements by Russian officials, and Kremlin propagandists are directed, directly or indirectly, against Latvia. For instance, Russian state institutions, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, are increasingly focusing on Latvia in various reports, falsely disseminating messages about the oppression of the Russian-speaking population and the resurgence of Nazism.
Viewing information influence activities as a potential indicator of escalation or confrontation, it should be noted that a significant increase in intensity is observed and expected in such situations. In this way, Russia tries to use the information space to influence the views of the target audience, such as their readiness and willingness to oppose Russia.
Different Audiences
Russia&#8217;s goal is to use information influence activities to impact audiences&#8217; value orientation, and here different audiences must be distinguished.
Some of Russia&#8217;s developed messages are aimed at the Russian domestic audience. This allows Russia to construct the image of an external enemy and a sense of threat, influencing public opinion. It is important to note that dominance in the information space is also used to shield President V. Putin from responsibility for what is happening in the country, while glorifying his role in Russia&#8217;s history and development.
In the context of the domestic audience, it&#8217;s worth highlighting the most prominent propaganda mouthpieces, such as V. Solovyov. Such broadcasts and publications often contain not only aggressive but also dramatic messages about current events, which can raise concerns about Russia&#8217;s readiness to act, while also testing the Russian public&#8217;s reaction and support. However, such broadcasts and statements made in them must be viewed critically. These broadcasts follow commercial logic, meaning that generating hype is based on the need to attract attention, which stimulates the development of increasingly dramatic messages. In addition, they also have political significance – against the backdrop of such extravagant personalities and statements, V. Putin appears moderate and rational, which helps develop his public image and thus garner support for his position.
At the same time, a large portion of messages are also targeted at audiences outside Russia. This audience, in turn, can be divided into several subcategories.
One such audience comprises compatriots living abroad and pro-Russian individuals. This audience already supports Russia&#8217;s policies, and a change in their views is not necessary. Russia often uses representatives of this audience – various pro-Russian activists – in the creation and dissemination of propaganda and disinformation.
In the long term, Russia almost certainly hopes that its information influence activities will also reach the international community. Its goal is for the international community to put pressure on Latvia to change its policy towards Russia.
Another separate target group is Latvian society. Although Russia currently cannot directly and significantly influence public opinion, it tries to do so in various more hidden ways, for example, by emphasizing Latvia&#8217;s economic problems and trying to highlight any other shortcomings, thereby discrediting and weakening the Latvian state. Given Russia&#8217;s goals and motivation, it&#8217;s necessary to critically weigh the response to such actions so as not to give them undeserved attention and an increase in publicity, which would polarize the opinions of Latvian society.
Measuring Propaganda&#8217;s Temperature While Avoiding Amplification
Therefore, when assessing the impact of Russian information pressure, SAB considers various factors and their changes over time. Activities in the information space must be handled responsibly, as it is one of the indicators that can signal Russia&#8217;s intentions to escalate the situation, as the example of Ukraine also confirms. This justifies the need to track Russia&#8217;s activities to prepare for potential actions in a timely manner. At the same time, the significance, impact, and potential consequences of such activities should not be overstated, as this can create unwarranted anxiety and, in fact, amplify Russia&#8217;s messages. It should be added that activities in the information space are one of many indicators of intentions; therefore, SAB also monitors other Russian activities to detect changes in the threat level in a timely manner and issue warnings.
Based on SAB analysis, it must be emphasized that Russia&#8217;s activity regarding the Baltic states, including Latvia, remains at a significantly lower level than it was regarding Ukraine. It unequivocally indicates strained relations between the countries but does not suggest a real readiness or intention to implement any military measures that would pose a short-term threat to Latvia&#8217;s security. Both the intensity and the content of the messages themselves, although relentlessly aggressive, are not comparable to what was directed against Ukraine. Such Russian activities will continue to receive increased attention, while the necessity of reactions and response steps will be assessed.
Regarding the overall security situation in our region, SAB maintains its current view: currently, while Russia&#8217;s military resources are concentrated in Ukraine, the probability of a direct military confrontation between Russia and NATO is low. However, if the war in Ukraine were to be "frozen" and the armed forces no longer suffered significant military losses in active combat, the Russian military threat to NATO would significantly increase. Russia could implement plans to increase military forces towards NATO&#8217;s northeastern flank, including the Baltics, within approximately a 5-year period.
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This article by the Constitution Protection Bureau is published in a series of articles on various topics that are current in society. The purpose of the series of articles is to provide expertise on important issues for Latvian society, in order to supplement the informational space with reliable information that would serve the citizens as an explanation of current processes in the country and a forecast for their development.

The intensity of Russian propaganda as an indicator of the national threat level

Egils Zviedris 
Director of the Constitution Protection Bureau
In April 12th, 2025, the Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB), marks its 30th anniversary. Established in the spring of 1995, by a decision of the Latvian Parliament, Saeima, SAB’s history coincides with the rebirth of our country. In the early 1990s, Latvian foreign and defence policy was focused on dismantling the remnants of Soviet occupation – working towards the withdrawal of the Russian army from Latvia (which concluded in 1998) and reintegration into the Western community. It was clear that Russia, the heir to the USSR, could re-emerge as a threat to our national security, once it had recovered from the economic and political damage caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The Constitution Protection Bureau was created as a completely new intelligence service, without the experience, culture and “values” of the State Security Committee (KGB). A decision, which, at the time, draw a lot of criticism. There were quite a few suggestions that a lot could be gained by employing the experienced KGB “professionals” loyal to Latvia. However, looking back, it is clear that the right call was made. Unlike other countries in the region, Latvia managed to minimize the risks of espionage arising from the corporate connections of Soviet-era KGB officers. Yet, creating a brand new institution had its own challenges, while acquiring knowledge from Western partners, building our capabilities, and seeking and developing our own areas of expertise.
Getting rid of the Soviet legacy was an important condition for building bilateral relations with Western intelligence and security services. Cooperation between intelligence services is based on mutual trust, which has to be built through tireless and consistent actions over a long period of time. Even the title and legal status of the SAB reflect the principles of a democratic state. Constitution Protection Bureau is submitted to the constitution and the rule of law, rather than a particular state official, as it is characteristic for authoritarian countries. The political balance, neutrality and objectivity in SAB’s relations to other government institutions and appointed officials is also ensured by the requirement for the director of SAB to be confirmed by the majority of the Saeima.
The Centre for Documentation of the Consequences of Totalitarianism, which is part of the SAB, also played a significant role in dismantling the Soviet legacy. SAB ensured the preservation and collection of KGB documents, which allowed for the legal and moral rehabilitation of people who had been spied on, persecuted and repressed by the “cheka”. In accordance with the requirements of the law “On Preservation and Use of Documents of the State Security Committee (KGB) and on Establishment of the Fact of Collaboration with the KGB”, SAB digitized the KGB documents. In 2019, the materials were transferred to National Archives of Latvia for permanent storage, where they are currently available on the archive’s website.
Over the years, the SAB developed its capabilities to ensure the protection of classified information. Effective protection of classified information enhances public confidence in government authorities and assures foreign partner services that the provided information is adequately protected. These factors were essential for the establishment of the National Security Authority in 2003, which was a mandatory requirement for Latvia’s membership in NATO and the European Union. Each member state must establish an authority supervising the protection of classified information. These requirements are also related to the SAB’s obligation to conduct counterintelligence in accordance with NATO and European Union standards. The procedures for protection of NATO and European Union classified information implemented in Latvia are regularly checked and positively assessed during inspections by the Security Office of the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union and NATO Office of Security, which is a high assessment of our work.
Security clearances for access to classified information have always attracted a lot of public and political attention. Vetting for access to national classified information is carried out by all three state security institutions, while security clearances for access to Latvian national TOP SECRET information are issued only by SAB, based on the vetting carried out by all three state security institutions. Looking back over the past years, SAB has denied TOP SECRET security clearances for officials representing the entire political spectrum. In my opinion, this clearly shows the professionalism and political neutrality of SAB, rejecting the occasional claims of “political incompetence”, “supporting the ruling parties” or “maintaining a police state”. From time to time, the principles and procedures for protection of classified information have been scrutinized by the public for various reasons, however, today’s rapidly changing geopolitical situation has shown that the current procedures allow us to prevent or minimize internal security risks.
Nowadays, collective decision-making requires increasing cooperation between intelligence and security services, making international cooperation an important aspect of the SAB’s activities. Latvian foreign and security policy is focused on European and transatlantic cooperation within the framework of NATO. This entails a number of international responsibilities and obligations.
After Latvia’s accession to NATO, 2011 was a particularly important year in the history of the SAB. Our service chaired a newly established NATO structure – the Civil Intelligence Committee, which unites more than 40 intelligence services. Latvia (SAB) was the first presiding country in this format, which continues to operate today. After discussions among member states and an assessment of the existing system, a decision was made to reform the structure of NATO bodies – several committees were closed, reduced or merged. The member states agreed to expand and modernize the NATO intelligence system. Within the framework of NATO, the SAB conducts extensive cooperation in the areas of intelligence, counterintelligence and protection of classified information. We have always been guided by the principle that we are part of NATO, instead of viewing it as an external structure. To this day, cooperation between intelligence services of NATO nations belongs to the foundation of Latvian security.
We have, occasionally, encountered criticism regarding the SAB’s allegedly slow or ineffective activities. In many cases, the specific nature of our work and the legislative restrictions do not allow us to reveal the full reasoning behind the decisions made. However, I would like to emphasize that SAB has always acted and will continue to act in the best interests of Latvian national security.
Without national security there can be no independence or even existence of our country. No matter what the future might bring, we are ready and determined to protect the security of Latvia.
It is our greatest honour to serve Latvia!
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30 Years Guarding National Security

On February 17, the Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB) publishes the unclassified part of the annual report for the year 2024. Along with last year&#8217;s analysis, SAB also provides forecast on the possible development of current security issues.
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, European countries have faced a new but increasingly significant threat – sabotage, diversions and physical attacks on targets in Europe by Russian intelligence and security services. In 2024, cases of Russian-organized sabotage have significantly increased, affecting more and more European countries. The new trend confirms that Russia is already having a direct confrontation with the West.
Russian intelligence and security services are currently developing their capabilities to organize sabotage in Europe. It is part of Moscow’s preparation for a possible military confrontation with NATO in the long term. The current concentration of Russian military resources in Ukraine makes the likelihood of a direct Russian-NATO military confrontation in 2025 rather low. However, if the war would become “frozen” and Russia would no longer have to suffer significant losses during the active hostilities in Ukraine, Moscow would be able to increase its military presence next to NATO’s north-eastern flank, including the Baltics within the next 5 years. This scenario would significantly increase Russia’s military threat to NATO, states the report.
“When facing a potential external threat, it is particularly important to maintain domestic stability and resilience. This applies at all levels, from the individual to the political, including the international arena. The decision-makers must think strategically, considering the long-term developments and security context. To maintain our security, we must develop our strength - no one tries to attack the strong and self-confident,” emphasizes Egils Zviedris, director of SAB, commenting on the current security challenges.
The classified part of the annual report will be reviewed by the Cabinet of Ministers and the National Security Commission of the Parliament of Latvia. Thereby the directions of the activities of the Constitution Protection Bureau for the year 2025 will be approved.
The full text of the report is available <a href="https://www.sab.gov.lv/files/uploads/2025/02/SAB-gada-parskats_2024_ENG.pdf">here</a>.
It is also possible to find out about the annual report, as well as other information disseminated by SAB on the social network X: @SAB_LV.
SAB report provides an overview of counter-intelligence, cyber security, intelligence and classified information protection issues in 2024. The report also includes an assessment of domestic and foreign policy developments in Russia and Belarus in 2024, taking into account the particularly active efforts of the special services of these countries to influence the EU and NATO countries, including Latvia.

Russia is purposefully developing its capabilities to confront NATO, Constitution Protection Bureau states, publishing its annual report

Please find below Annual Public Reports of the Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB). Public reports partially contain the information which is included in SAB’s report to the Cabinet of Ministers of Latvia (the Government).

Neutralisation of activities of intelligence and security services unfriendly to Latvia.

Obtaining background information on activities of foreign institutions or persons against the interests of the Latvian state.

Issuance of special permits for access to state secrets. Protection of EU and NATO classified information.

Header EN

The head of the Constitution Protection Bureau is director. Candidates for the director&#8217;s post are promoted by the national Security Council but the director is appointed by the Saeima. Initially the term in office was 4 years. Now it is extended to 5 years. The number of such terms in office by one person is not limited.
In line with the amendments to the Saeima Rules of Procedure adopted in January 2012 the director of SAB will be appointed by an open ballot.
Since 20 January, 2022 Egils Zviedris is the Director of SAB.
<figure id="attachment_1494" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-1494" style="width: 384px" class="wp-caption alignnone"><img decoding="async" loading="lazy" class=" wp-image-1494" src="https://www.sab.gov.lv/files/uploads/2023/10/E.Zviedris.jpg" alt="" width="384" height="256" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-1494" class="wp-caption-text">Egils Zviedris, Director of SAB</figcaption></figure>
 
Former SAB&#8217;s directors:
02.05.2013.–11.11.2021. Jānis Maizītis 
02.05.2003. – 01.05.2013. Jānis Kažociņš 
12.04.1995. – 02.05.2003. Lainis Kamaldiņš

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