On January 26, the Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB) publishes <a href="/files/uploads/2026/01/SABs-annual-report_2025_ENG.pdf">the unclassified part of the annual report for the year 2025</a>. Along with last year&#8217;s analysis, SAB also provides forecast on the possible development of current security issues.
Russia&#8217;s goal is to weaken the West both nationally and internationally. Over the past few years, Moscow’s perception of the West as an existential threat to the ruling regime has intensified. Russia believes it has already entered a direct confrontation with the West: the struggle takes place not only in Ukraine, but also globally and ideologically. Russia’s aggravated threat perception means a significant increase of security threats for Europe, stated in the report.
To implement its influence and plans, Russia continues to use and constantly adapt existing ones, as well as create new hybrid instruments. One of the instruments that is increasingly being applied is the use of legal mechanisms in the international arena with the aim to discredit Latvia on an international level and ensure a long-term international pressure on Latvia to change its policy towards Russia and the Russian-speaking population. There is a separate chapter in the report, explaining the use of this mechanism.
In SAB’s assessment Russia will continue to pose a significant military threat to European countries and NATO. The militarization of the Russian economy will continue even after a potential conclusion or freezing of the war in Ukraine
SAB’s information shows that Russia’s perception of Latvia is becoming increasingly similar to the one Russia had of Ukraine before the war. While Russia does not pose a direct military threat to Latvia at the moment, a number of signs indicate potential long-term plans.
“Last year, when analysing the state of security situation in the region, we assessed that under the right conditions Russian military threat to NATO could substantially increase over a five-year period. Recently, various experts have been predicting it over the next two to three years. The situation has changed, the threat has increased, but curently, we are not limiting it to a certain time frame as the situation is influenced by various factors and their combination. The threat level stemming from Russia will remain high, therefore, we must work purposefully to reduce it. We must also be prepared for the fact that Russia will try to exert its influence on the upcoming parliamentary elections in Latvia this fall,” notes Egils Zviedris, director of SAB, commenting on the annual report and the current security challenges.
The classified part of the annual report will be reviewed by the Cabinet of Ministers and the National Security Commission of the Parliament of Latvia. Thereby the directions of the activities of the Constitution Protection Bureau for the year 2026 will be approved.
The full text of the report is available <a href="/files/uploads/2026/01/SABs-annual-report_2025_ENG.pdf">here</a>.
It is also possible to find out about the annual report, as well as other information disseminated by SAB on the social network X: @SAB_LV.
SAB report provides an overview of intelligence, counter-intelligence, cyber security, and classified information protection issues in 2025. The report also includes an assessment of domestic and foreign policy developments in Russia and the third countries (outside the EU and NATO), taking into account the particularly active efforts of the special services of these countries to influence the EU and NATO countries, including Latvia.
SAB is one of three Latvian state security institutions that, in accordance with the procedures established by law, conduct intelligence and counterintelligence, protect classified information, monitor critical infrastructure of information and communication technologies, and also conduct and control the exchange of classified information with international organizations.

The Constitution Protection Bureau publishes the annual report 2025

<img decoding="async" loading="lazy" class="alignnone wp-image-1815" src="/files/uploads/2025/10/EU-INTCEN-un-SAB-direktoru-tiksanas-16.10.2025.jpg" alt="" width="922" height="692" />
On October 16, the Director of the Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB), Egils Zviedris, met with the Director of the European Union Intelligence and Situation Centre (EU INTCEN) Daniel Markić. During the meeting, the directors discussed the further development and directions of EU INTCEN, as well as cooperation between SAB and EU INTCEN.
SAB has had a long term cooperation with EU INTCEN, ensuring that Latvian intelligence information and expertise help to shape the position of EU decision-makers on key issues related to European security.
The intelligence expertise of the SAB and the Baltic States in general on the security situation in the region plays a significant role in formulating EU INTCEN&#8217;s analytical assessments for the highest level EU officials," D. Markić emphasized to the director of SAB.
"It is of utmost importance to promote the unity of European countries and ensure that EU decision-makers have a common understanding of the security issues relevant to Latvia and the Baltic region. Successful cooperation with EU INTCEN is one of the key elements for this to be accomplished. Through this cooperation, our service helps to shape European security policy, which is particularly important in the context of the current regional threat," confirming the readiness to continue cooperation between SAB and EU INTCEN, stated the SAB Director.
EU INTCEN is an intelligence analysis agency of the European Union and a part of the European External Action Service under the authority of the High Representative. EU INTCEN&#8217;s analytical products are based on intelligence from the intelligence and security services of the EU member states.

SAB and EU INTCEN Directors Stress Importance of Intelligence Expertise in European Security Context

The joint Russian-Belarusian strategic military exercise, "Zapad-2025," will take place from 12 to 16 September. The exercises will be held mainly on Belarusian territory, however the military activities are also planned for Kaliningrad and the newly re-established Moscow and Leningrad military districts. The officially announced objectives of "Zapad-2025" are to simulate joint defensive and offensive operations and to improve cooperation between the Russian and Belarusian armed forces. Although the Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB) assesses that the military exercises pose a low level of threat to Latvia and NATO, Russia and Belarus are using "Zapad-2025" in their domestic and foreign policy strategic communication.
For a domestic audience, the Putin regime is using the "Zapad-2025" exercises to clearly convey that, regardless of the war in Ukraine, Russia is capable of developing and strengthening its military capabilities and of responding to military threats. This message is well-received in the Russian and Belarusian information space, as it emphasizes the stability of the regimes, the existence of a reliable ally, and the defensive nature of the exercises. Simultaneously, it is used to accuse Western countries of aggressive foreign policy and of worsening the security situation in the region. This, in turn, fosters anti-Western sentiment in Russian society and justifies the Putin regime&#8217;s aggressive foreign policy, especially the war in Ukraine.
As "Zapad-2025" exercises are receiving increased attention, Russia is also crafting similar foreign policy messages – regardless of the war in Ukraine, Russia is capable of developing and strengthening its military presence at NATO&#8217;s borders. To increase the strategic significance of the exercise, Russia and Belarus also carries out tactical nuclear weapon drills and demonstrate their new military equipment. The Western countries are the primary target audience of these messages, as it clearly signals Russia&#8217;s extensive military capabilities, including its nuclear capabilities.
"Zapad-2025" exercises also highlight another feature of Russian and, especially, Belarusian strategic communication: both countries are portraying themselves as responsible and pragmatic neighbors who are forced to respond to threats created by Western countries. In May this year, Belarusian officials announced that the exercises would be moved from the Belarusian western border deeper into Belarusian territory and that the scale of the exercises would be reduced — officially, fewer than 13,000 participants will take part in the exercises in Belarus. Belarus also announced that, despite the reduced scale of the exercises, it still invites international observers, including from the Baltic states, to participate. According to Belarusian officials, the main goal of these actions was to show a willingness to de-escalate regional tensions.
However, this narrative of pragmatism was quickly turned against the Baltic states and Poland. Belarusian officials spread narratives that NATO (the Baltic states and Poland) are using "Zapad-2025" as a pretext for militarization, despite the seemingly demonstrated goodwill from Belarus and Russia in reducing the scale of the exercises and moving them further away from NATO borders.
It&#8217;s highly likely that as the active phase of "Zapad-2025" approaches, Russian and Belarusian statements will become louder and information campaigns against Latvia and NATO will increase. It is also very likely that Russian and Belarusian officials will pay a close attention to narratives disseminated in NATO&#8217;s information space with the aim of dramatizing them and using them in their own information campaigns.
Overall, the military threat posed by the exercises to Latvia and NATO is assessed as low — Russia&#8217;s military and political involvement in exercises is lower than in previous years, and Russian military resources remain concentrated on the war in Ukraine. At the same time, SAB encourages residents to be vigilant and report suspicious observations in the border area, such as communication disruptions, to the authorities.
This article by the Constitution Protection Bureau is published in a series of articles on various topics that are current in society. The purpose of the series of articles is to provide expertise on important issues for Latvian society, in order to supplement the informational space with reliable information that would serve the citizens as an explanation of current processes in the country and a forecast for their development.

Moscow and Minsk uses Zapad-2025 to exert information and psychological influence

Since regaining independence, Latvia has faced a gradual increase in Russia&#8217;s hybrid activities. These activities employ various non-military tools with a singular objective: to influence Latvia, its policies, and its society. Given Russia&#8217;s confrontational foreign policy and recent hybrid and conventional invasions of its neighbors, it&#8217;s crucial to understand how hybrid warfare can be used to prepare for broader conventional warfare.
One of the most common manifestations of Russia&#8217;s hybrid warfare in Latvia and the Baltic States is propaganda and disinformation and the associated information operations. These information operations aim to influence, or even change, the target audience&#8217;s values and beliefs in a way that favors Russia. Russia&#8217;s actions concerning Ukraine corroborate this. Before the full-scale invasion, extensive information campaigns sought to influence Ukrainian society, reducing its readiness to resist and making Russia appear more appealing. Therefore, Russian information campaigns are an indicator that can signal an escalation of relations, including, in their ultimate form, a readiness to use military aggression to achieve their goals.
However, when assessing Russia&#8217;s information activities and their effectiveness, it&#8217;s necessary to consider their intensity, the content of their messages, and their intended audiences. This helps answer a broader question: can such campaigns serve as a precursor to further escalation and even military confrontation? The significance of this question is amplified by Russia&#8217;s own understanding of hybrid warfare, where information campaigns may be followed by military activities to achieve influence over a target country&#8217;s strategic objectives.
Parameters of an indicator
The Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB) constantly monitors and analyzes Russian information influence campaigns and operations within its competence. Russia&#8217;s efforts regarding Latvia demonstrate long-standing trends. Compared to the period before Russia&#8217;s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the aggressiveness and intensity of Russian propaganda and disinformation directed at Latvia have increased.
When analyzing Russia&#8217;s influence activities against Latvia, SAB pays particular attention to the content and aggressiveness of the disseminated propaganda and disinformation. Most messages are reactive, with Russia responding to Latvia&#8217;s decisions and statements. Over the past three years, SAB has observed no new trends in Russian messages; instead, they have become part of existing disinformation trends. These largely include accusations of historical revisionism, promoting and using Russophobia and discriminatory measures, political aggression against Russia, and short-sighted submission to a Western-dictated political course.
In some cases, Russia&#8217;s information influence activities are also proactive. These often align with historically significant dates or events for Russia, as Russia seeks to proactively prepare the information space. For example, increased activity is observed annually around March 16 or May 9, when Russia raises issues concerning World War II and its course, resulting in accusations against Latvia and the Western world in general of historical revisionism and glorifying fascism and Nazism. Given the municipal elections scheduled for this weekend, SAB is also carefully monitoring Russian activities in the information space in this context.
Russian information activities are not static; they are characterized by their ability to adapt and utilize topics relevant to different audiences for greater effect. The intensity of Russian disinformation is high but stable, maintaining its consistently high level. Every month, dozens of publications and statements by Russian officials, and Kremlin propagandists are directed, directly or indirectly, against Latvia. For instance, Russian state institutions, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, are increasingly focusing on Latvia in various reports, falsely disseminating messages about the oppression of the Russian-speaking population and the resurgence of Nazism.
Viewing information influence activities as a potential indicator of escalation or confrontation, it should be noted that a significant increase in intensity is observed and expected in such situations. In this way, Russia tries to use the information space to influence the views of the target audience, such as their readiness and willingness to oppose Russia.
Different Audiences
Russia&#8217;s goal is to use information influence activities to impact audiences&#8217; value orientation, and here different audiences must be distinguished.
Some of Russia&#8217;s developed messages are aimed at the Russian domestic audience. This allows Russia to construct the image of an external enemy and a sense of threat, influencing public opinion. It is important to note that dominance in the information space is also used to shield President V. Putin from responsibility for what is happening in the country, while glorifying his role in Russia&#8217;s history and development.
In the context of the domestic audience, it&#8217;s worth highlighting the most prominent propaganda mouthpieces, such as V. Solovyov. Such broadcasts and publications often contain not only aggressive but also dramatic messages about current events, which can raise concerns about Russia&#8217;s readiness to act, while also testing the Russian public&#8217;s reaction and support. However, such broadcasts and statements made in them must be viewed critically. These broadcasts follow commercial logic, meaning that generating hype is based on the need to attract attention, which stimulates the development of increasingly dramatic messages. In addition, they also have political significance – against the backdrop of such extravagant personalities and statements, V. Putin appears moderate and rational, which helps develop his public image and thus garner support for his position.
At the same time, a large portion of messages are also targeted at audiences outside Russia. This audience, in turn, can be divided into several subcategories.
One such audience comprises compatriots living abroad and pro-Russian individuals. This audience already supports Russia&#8217;s policies, and a change in their views is not necessary. Russia often uses representatives of this audience – various pro-Russian activists – in the creation and dissemination of propaganda and disinformation.
In the long term, Russia almost certainly hopes that its information influence activities will also reach the international community. Its goal is for the international community to put pressure on Latvia to change its policy towards Russia.
Another separate target group is Latvian society. Although Russia currently cannot directly and significantly influence public opinion, it tries to do so in various more hidden ways, for example, by emphasizing Latvia&#8217;s economic problems and trying to highlight any other shortcomings, thereby discrediting and weakening the Latvian state. Given Russia&#8217;s goals and motivation, it&#8217;s necessary to critically weigh the response to such actions so as not to give them undeserved attention and an increase in publicity, which would polarize the opinions of Latvian society.
Measuring Propaganda&#8217;s Temperature While Avoiding Amplification
Therefore, when assessing the impact of Russian information pressure, SAB considers various factors and their changes over time. Activities in the information space must be handled responsibly, as it is one of the indicators that can signal Russia&#8217;s intentions to escalate the situation, as the example of Ukraine also confirms. This justifies the need to track Russia&#8217;s activities to prepare for potential actions in a timely manner. At the same time, the significance, impact, and potential consequences of such activities should not be overstated, as this can create unwarranted anxiety and, in fact, amplify Russia&#8217;s messages. It should be added that activities in the information space are one of many indicators of intentions; therefore, SAB also monitors other Russian activities to detect changes in the threat level in a timely manner and issue warnings.
Based on SAB analysis, it must be emphasized that Russia&#8217;s activity regarding the Baltic states, including Latvia, remains at a significantly lower level than it was regarding Ukraine. It unequivocally indicates strained relations between the countries but does not suggest a real readiness or intention to implement any military measures that would pose a short-term threat to Latvia&#8217;s security. Both the intensity and the content of the messages themselves, although relentlessly aggressive, are not comparable to what was directed against Ukraine. Such Russian activities will continue to receive increased attention, while the necessity of reactions and response steps will be assessed.
Regarding the overall security situation in our region, SAB maintains its current view: currently, while Russia&#8217;s military resources are concentrated in Ukraine, the probability of a direct military confrontation between Russia and NATO is low. However, if the war in Ukraine were to be "frozen" and the armed forces no longer suffered significant military losses in active combat, the Russian military threat to NATO would significantly increase. Russia could implement plans to increase military forces towards NATO&#8217;s northeastern flank, including the Baltics, within approximately a 5-year period.
&nbsp;
This article by the Constitution Protection Bureau is published in a series of articles on various topics that are current in society. The purpose of the series of articles is to provide expertise on important issues for Latvian society, in order to supplement the informational space with reliable information that would serve the citizens as an explanation of current processes in the country and a forecast for their development.

The intensity of Russian propaganda as an indicator of the national threat level

Please find below Annual Public Reports of the Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB). Public reports partially contain the information which is included in SAB’s report to the Cabinet of Ministers of Latvia (the Government).

Neutralisation of activities of intelligence and security services unfriendly to Latvia.

Obtaining background information on activities of foreign institutions or persons against the interests of the Latvian state.

Issuance of special permits for access to state secrets. Protection of EU and NATO classified information.

The Constitution Protection Bureau publishes the annual report 2025

News

Our Tasks